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BRIEF OF THE METAL WARE CORPORATION 
LIST OF PARTIES 
Appellants are Timothy J. Tabor, Deborah A. Tabor, and Farmers Insurance 
Company. 
The only Appellee before this Court is The Metal Ware Corporation, a 
Wisconsin corporation. Other entities named in the U.S. District Court proceedings 
include NESCO/American Harvest, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, Newco of Two Rivers, 
Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, and American Harvest, Inc., a Minnesota corporation. 
NESCO/American Harvest, Inc., and Newco of Two Rivers, Inc., were Wisconsin entities 
that were formed by Metal Ware to purchase assets from American Harvest, Inc., the 
Minnesota corporation, which manufactured the product purchased by the Tabors. 
Additionally, co-defendants in the U.S. District Court proceeding, ShopKo 
and Englewood Electric, the retailer and wholesaler in the chain of distribution, have 
settled and are no longer parties. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this certification of questions 
of law from the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
§ 78-2-2(l)(2006). 
CERTIFIED ISSUES 
1. Whether Utah would recognize an exception to the traditional rule of 
non-liability of a successor entity to an asset purchase, or whether Utah will continue to 
follow the majority rule by rejecting the non-traditional product line and continuity of 
enterprise theories. 
2a. Whether Utah should create and impose an independent, post-sale 
duty to warn on successor entities to an asset purchase requiring them to warn a customer 
or owner of a product of defects in products manufactured by a predecessor entity. 
2b. If an independent duty to warn is imposed on a successor entity to an 
asset purchase, whether Utah should follow the jurisdictions that impose a narrowly-
tailored independent duty to warn that arises only when the following standard is 
satisfied: (1) there is a significant, continuing, independent relationship between the asset 
purchase successor and the customer who owns and possesses the product; (2) the 
relationship is a special one based upon substantial and meaningful contact; and (3) the 
relationship developed as an independent one, based upon a business relationship that 
1 
developed exclusive of the asset purchase succession. Also, whether Utah should 
consider the same factors considered by other jurisdictions in determining whether this 
standard of an independent, special relationship exists between the asset purchase 
successor and the customer or owner of the product, including, but not limited to: (1) the 
asset purchase successor entity's succession to service contracts; (2) coverage of the 
particular product possessed by the customer by a service contract; (3) actual service of 
the product by the asset purchase successor; (4) the asset purchase successor's knowledge 
of the defect; and (5) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the customer's 
location. 
Because these issues are on certification from the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and this Court answers the legal questions presented, and the preservation 
requirement is inapplicable, and it is unnecessary to set forth a standard of review. See, 
e.g., In re Kunz, 2004 UT 71, t 2 , 99 P.3d 793. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or 
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal. However, Sections 12 
and 13 of Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts were noted by the Tenth Circuit in its 
certification order, and may have a bearing on the Court's determination. These sections 
are attached as Addenda "A" and "B," respectively. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter is before the Court on certification from the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals. Accordingly, the facts outlined in the certification order are adopted by this 
court. See, Robert J. DeBry and Associates, P.C. v. Qwest Dex, Inc., 2006 UT 41, ^2, 
P.3d_. 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
In 1996, the Tabors purchased a food dehydrator manufactured in 1995 by 
American Harvest, Inc. Approximately one year later, in April 1997, Metal Ware entered 
into an asset purchase agreement with American Harvest whereby Metal Ware purchased 
certain American Harvest assets, but not liabilities—including products liabilities. Metal 
Ware did not purchase all of American Harvest, through a stock trade or merger just 
certain assets constituting select product lines, leaving American Harvest in operation. 
Back in 1995, the United States Consumer Products Safety Commission instructed 
American Harvest to issue a recall notice for the product, which it did. Thus, both the 
recall and the purchase of the item by the Tabors took place well before Metal Ware 
purchased any assets from American Harvest. As an asset purchase successor, Metal 
Ware never possessed, designed, manufactured, sold, distributed, serviced, or had 
anything at all to do with the Tabors' American Harvest product in question. 
The Tabors allege that the American Harvest food dehydrator caused a fire 
in their home. They sued American Harvest, ShopKo (retailer), Englewood (middleman), 
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and Metal Ware in strict products liability. The Complaint alleged that Metal Ware 
actually distributed the product, but once the plaintiffs admitted in their depositions that 
the product was purchased a year before Metal Ware had any involvement with American 
Harvest, they changed their theory to one of successor liability, but never amended their 
complaint to reflect those allegations. In short, successor liability was never pleaded on 
this case. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION BELOW 
Because it was not in the chain of distribution as a manufacturer or seller, 
Metal Ware moved for summary judgment, claiming it owed no liability under any strict 
products liability theory. The parties opposing the motion—the plaintiffs and co-
defendant ShopKo—advanced non-traditional theories for successor liability from other 
jurisdictions. They claimed that the product line and continuity of enterprise theories-
theories adopted by only a very small minority of jurisdictions-imposed successor 
liability on Metal Ware notwithstanding the fact that Metal Ware did not merge with 
American Harvest, but instead purchased only certain select assets. The U.S. District 
Court rejected the product line and continuity of enterprise theories, concluding that these 
theories did not constitute Utah law, and that Utah courts would not adopt these theories 
in the future. Because Metal Ware was not in the chain of distribution, the District Court 
granted Metal Ware's motion for summary judgment in part. 
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However, the U.S. District Court kept the case alive by allowing the 
plaintiffs to proceed on an "independent failure to warn" theory, as discussed in Florom v. 
Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir.1989), a case involving Colorado law, not Utah 
law.1 Despite recognizing that "no Utah court appears to have acknowledged [a duty to 
warn] in a successor corporation," the U.S. District Court imposed Colorado's 
independent duty on Metal Ware, requiring it to warn "somebody." In imposing this 
independent duty to warn "somebody," the U.S. District Court erred in concluding that 
the independent duty was to warn the retailer (ShopKo), as opposed to the actual 
customer who possessed the product (the Tabors). 
Subsequently, Metal Ware filed another motion for summary judgment, 
pointing out that: (1) the plaintiffs never pleaded an independent duty to warn claim in 
their complaints, (2) that failure to warn was not the law in Utah, and (3) that even if it 
were the law in Utah, given the undisputed facts, Metal Ware did not owe any such duty 
to the Tabors. Metal Ware insisted that the independent duty to warn found in Colorado 
law could not be applied here because the duty required an independent, ongoing special 
relationship between Metal Ware (the successor to the manufacturer), and the ultimate 
owner of the product (the Tabors). This independent, ongoing special relationship had to 
be based upon substantial and meaningful contact between the successor and the product 
1
 The Tenth Circuit points out that "[t]he district court also relied on our decision 
in Florom . . .However, because that case discussed Colorado, rather than Utah law, we 
do not rely on it in this discussion." (Certification p. 5, fn. 3.) 
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owner. In fact, Florom and the other failure to warn cases make it clear that the 
"customer" in the failure to warn context is the actual person or entity that owns the 
machine and has the machine in his, her, or its possession, and not a middleman or 
retailer. 
No relationship of any kind ever existed between Metal Ware and the 
Tabors. Metal Ware did not even know the Tabors existed until the Tabors filed their 
lawsuit. Metal Ware had no idea the Tabors purchased a product from the predecessor 
manufacturer, and had no idea where the product or the Tabors were located, making a 
warning to them, even if required, impossible. Notwithstanding, the U.S. District Court 
imposed an independent duty to warn on Metal Ware to warn the wholesalers and 
retailers through whom the predecessor manufacturer sold the product before Metal Ware 
purchased the assets of the manufacturer. The District Court noted at oral argument that 
"Metal Ware had really no duty to warn [the Tabors]. They didn't know about them. 
They had a duty to warn [ShopKo] perhaps." (Oral Argument transcript at 15:10-12, 
Aplee. Supp. App. at 15.) 
With the case set to go to trial on the sole theory of an independent duty to 
warn only against Metal Ware (ShopKo and Englewood had settled out by then), the 
deposition of the only ShopKo witness designated for trial, Ms. Shelley Schroeder, was 
taken. Ms. Schroeder testified as follows: ShopKo had no information that the Tabors 
were customers of ShopKo; ShopKo had no record that the Tabors purchased the product 
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from a Utah ShopKo store as they claimed; ShopKo has written policies about how to 
handle recalls, but no written policies for addressing a warning that would have come 
after a product recall had already been issued and from an asset purchase successor; Ms. 
Schroeder did not know what ShopKo would have done with a warning from Metal Ware 
concerning the manufacturer's product because ShopKo has "never come across a 
situation like that;" and Ms. Schroeder had no evidence or information that a "warning" 
from Metal Ware would have actually resulted in a notice being posted in any Salt Lake 
City area ShopKo store, much less the actual West Jordan store where the Tabors 
purchased the American Harvest product more than a year before. 
Following Ms. Schroeder's deposition, Metal Ware filed its final motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds that there was no evidence of any causal connection 
between the purported failure to warn and the occurrence of the fire. Given Ms. 
Schroeder's testimony, the Appellants could not prove that any failure to warn by Metal 
Ware in fact caused any injury, as the evidence showed that any warning given to ShopKo 
would not have reached the Tabors. The jury would have been required to speculate to 
find a causal link, and the U.S. District Court properly dismissed Metal Ware. 
Appellants then appealed the dismissal of Metal Ware to the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Metal Ware argued that the U.S. District Court correctly granted 
summary judgment because there was no evidence that any failure to warn on Metal 
Ware's part would have made any difference at all in this case. Irrespective of the fact 
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that the independent duty to warn was erroneously imposed on Metal Ware to warn 
ShopKo (a middleman), as opposed to the Tabors (the actual customer in possession of 
the product), the plaintiffs still had no evidence that any warning to ShopKo would have 
reached the Tabors, thus avoiding the fire. 
Metal Ware also argued that the Tenth Circuit was entitled to affirm on the 
alternate ground that Metal Ware owed no duty to the Tabors in the first place. As an 
asset purchase successor to the manufacturer of the product, Metal Ware owed no duty to 
the Tabors under the traditional rule of non-liability of an asset purchase successor. 
Additionally, Metal Ware owed no independent duty to warn the Tabors inasmuch as it is 
not the law in Utah, was not pleaded by the plaintiffs, and Metal Ware had no relationship 
at all with the Tabors. In fact, Metal Ware did not even know the Tabors existed, much 
less maintain an independent, special relationship with them through substantial and 
meaningful contact. 
Instead of holding that summary judgment was proper based on no evidence 
of causation, and instead of concluding that Metal Ware owed no independent duty to 
warn an unknown consumer of a defect in a product distributed by a predecessor 
corporation to an asset purchase, the Tenth Circuit certified, on its own motion, two 
questions to this Court. 
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FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. In 1995, the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission 
("CPSC") issued a recall concerning certain food dehydrators manufactured and sold by 
American Harvest, Inc., of Minnesota ("American Harvest"). (Aplt. App. at 117). 
2. The Tabors bought an American Harvest dehydrator from a Utah 
ShopKo store in the summer of 1996. (Aplt. App. at 54). 
3. In April, 1997, Metal Ware purchased certain select assets, but not 
liabilities (product liabilities were specifically excluded) from American Harvest by 
means of an Asset Purchase Agreement. (Aplt. App. at 53). 
4. Thus, Metal Ware purchased certain assets from American Harvest 
two years after the CPSC recall, and one year after the allegedly defective dehydrator was 
already in the Tabors' home. 
5. Metal Ware moved for summary judgment in 2003, alleging that as a 
successor entity following a pure asset purchase, it bore no liability for products 
manufactured and sold by American Harvest. (Aplt. App. at 58). 
6. The U.S District Court recognized that there was "no evidence" that 
Metal Ware was in the chain of distribution; Metal Ware did not manufacture, sell, or 
distribute the Tabors' dehydrator. (Aplt. App. at 59.) 
7. Accordingly, the U.S. District Court entered an Order granting in 
part Metal Ware's motion for summary judgment; the District Court dismissed all claims 
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against Metal Ware as a non-distributor, but imposed a "claim for liability under a duty to 
warn theory." (Aplt. App. at 53-68). 
8. The U.S District Court dismissed all claims except the "failure to 
warn" claim because the evidence showed that Metal Ware did not distribute the item. 
(Aplt. App. at 59, 68). 
9. The U.S. District Court also declined to recognize the non-traditional 
product line and continuity of enterprise theories as Utah law, noting that "no published 
Utah decision has hinted at adopting the two additional exceptions, much less done so," 
and stating that "neither the product line or continuity of enterprise theories has been 
universally recognized in other states." Accordingly, no duty could be imposed on Metal 
Ware based on these non-traditional theories. (Aplt. App. at 64-65, 68). 
10. The U.S. District Court further correctly noted that "no one has 
argued that any of the four recognized exceptions to the general rule of successor 
corporation non-liability applies in the present case," meaning that no duty could be 
imposed on Metal Ware based on the traditional exceptions. (Aplt. App. at 64-65). 
11. Regarding the independent duty to warn theory, the U.S. District 
Court even noted that "[n]° Utah Court. . . appears to have acknowledged such a duty 
[to warn] in a successor company." (Aplt. App. at 65 n.7.) 
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12. Notwithstanding that concession, the U.S. District Court allowed the 
case to continue against Metal Ware on the independent duty to warn theory. (Aplt. App. 
at 68). 
13. Subsequently, Metal Ware sought dismissal on the basis that (1) 
plaintiffs never pleaded the failure to warn theory, (2) Utah law did not recognize the 
failure to warn theory; and (3) even assuming the theory was recognized in Utah, Metal 
Ware did not owe the independent duty to warn the Tabors under the circumstances of 
this case. (Aplt. App. at 71-73). 
14. In addressing Metal Ware's claim that the plaintiffs never pleaded 
the independent failure to warn theory in their complaints, the U.S. District Court 
erroneously concluded that the pleading of generic strict products liability under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 A was the equivalent of pleading the independent 
duty to warn owed by a successor. (Aplt. App. at 71-72). 
15. In addressing Metal Ware's claim that the failure to warn theory was 
not Utah law, the U.S. District Court correctly noted that "no Utah court has ruled on this 
specific issue," but then relied on Colorado law as found in Florom. (Aplt. App. at 72-
73). 
16. In addressing Metal Ware's argument that under the facts of this case 
Metal Ware could not owe the independent duty to warn to the Tabors, the U.S. District 
Court failed to acknowledge that Metal Ware pointed out that it could not owe the 
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independent duty to the Tabors because it had no contact with the Tabors; Metal Ware did 
not know who the Tabors were, and did not know the Tabors had purchased a dehydrator 
from American Harvest, much less where the Tabors or the product were located. (See 
Aplt. App. at 73-74; and Aplee. Supp. App. at 35, 40-42 (Metal Ware's Brief, Docket 
Entry #104 at pp. 5,9-12).) 
17. At oral argument, the U.S. District Court conveyed its 
misunderstanding of the duty to warn theory, stating t ha t " . . . Metal Ware had really no 
duty to warn them [the Tabors]. They didn't know about them. They had a duty to warn 
you [Shopko] perhaps." (See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15:10-12, Aplee. Supp. 
App. at 15.) 
18. The U.S District Court further stated tha t " . . . this isn't one of those 
cases where, you know, although Shopko is involved, they're not going back and saying, 
'well, yeah, but Metal Ware, you didn't warn us, so we couldn't pass it on . . . it's the 
Tabors who are saying we should have been warned." (See Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 28:24 to 29:4, Aplee. Supp. App. at 28-29.) 
19. In the end, in imposing the independent duty to warn, the U.S. 
District Court improperly focused on the purported relationship between Metal Ware and 
ShopKo, and the fact that Metal Ware continued to do business with ShopKo-a 
"customer" of American Harvest-instead of focusing on the germane relationship 
between Metal Ware and the Tabors, the owners of the product. (Aplt. App. at 74). 
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20. Accordingly, the U.S. District Court denied Metal Ware's request to 
be dismissed, stating that "it appears that the relationship between Defendants and 
American Harvest's customers was sufficient to impose a duty to warn on defendants." 
(Aplt. App. at 76). 
21. Subsequently, plaintiffs identified Shelley Schroeder as the only 
ShopKo representative to testify at trial. Mrs. Schroeder, ShopKo's Supervisor of Vendor 
Compliance, is in charge of product recalls and vendor compliance concerning quality 
and safety standards and procedures nationwide. (See Aplee. Supp. App. at 47-48 (Depo. 
of Shelley Schroeder at 5:16-6:14; 8:6-9, Ex. A to Metal Ware's December 9, 2004 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket Entry # 149).) 
22. In her deposition, Mrs. Schroeder gave the following critical 
testimony: 
a. ShopKo has no information that the Tabors were customers of 
ShopKo at all, much less that they had purchased the subject dehydrator from a 
Utah ShopKo store. (Id. at 8:14-21, Aplee. Supp. App. at 48.) 
b. Mrs. Schroeder has never contacted or dealt with any of 
ShopKo's Utah stores. (Id. at 15:11-15, Aplee. Supp. App. at 50.) 
c. She has never contacted Metal Ware about the CPSC recall 
ShopKo was informed of or about any consumer complaints related to the 
American Harvest dehydrators. (Id. at 16:20-24, Aplee. Supp. App. at 50.) 
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d. ShopKo has written policies about how to handle traditional 
recalls, but no written policies or procedures for a "warning" like the one 
suggested in this case. (Id. at 20:11-16, Aplee. Supp. App. at 51.) 
e. Mrs. Schroeder has never encountered, nor even heard of, a 
situation like the instant case where a recall from a manufacturer occurs, the recall 
is closed, and then a subsequent "warning" is given by anyone, much less a 
successor to an asset purchase. (Id. at 29:23-30:5; 33:17-34:2, Aplee. Supp. App. 
at 53-54.) 
f. She is not aware of any instances where a successor 
corporation contacted ShopKo about safety concerns related to a product made by 
that company's predecessor. (Id. at 34:16-23; 54:6-15, Aplee. Supp. App. at 55, 
60.) 
g. She is aware of no cases in which ShopKo has ever posted 
warnings or notices about a product safety issue outside of the context of a 
traditional product recall. (Id. at 33:9-16; 39:12-22, Aplee. Supp. App. at 54, 59.) 
h. Specifically, in the situations where safety concerns were 
raised outside of the traditional recall context, she is not aware of any case in 
which ShopKo ever posted any form of warning or notice in any of its stores 
anywhere. (Id., Aplee. Supp. App. at 54, 59.) 
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i. She did not know w 1 "tat SI lopKo v 01 ild 1 ia\ e acti lalb done 
with a "warning" from Metal Ware concerning American Harvest's dehydrators, 
because ShopKo has "never come across a situation like that." (See Id. at 35:3-18, 
A plee Si lpp \ pp • at 55 ) 
j . She had no evidence that a "warning" from Metal Ware 
would have actually resulted in a notice being posted in any Salt Lake City area 
2J. Given this undis:-./ *• • l •> • •• .-. mnvrd lor 
summary judgment on the grounds that the Plaintiffs lacked evidence to establish 
causation under the only theory left, the independent duty to warn. (Aplt. App. at 119). 
2 1 I letal i/ ' " ai c: pointed c I it tl lat gi\ c: t it .IV Is. S- :1 n: oeder's testin 101 \y , the 
plaintiffs could not prove a causal link; they could not prove that any failure by Metal 
Ware to warn ShopKo in fact caused the injury, and the jury would have to speculate to 
fii id. a cai isal Hi ill ;: ( I \ i ) 
25. Moreover, Metal Ware pointed out that the undisputed evidence w as 
that any warning given to ShopKo by Metal Ware would not have reached the Tabors. 
( \ j >lt V[ >t > ; tl 1 ! . ( : 20). 
26. The U.S. District Court agreed, and dismissi d l\ letal W;mi beamse 
the Tabors lacked sufficient facts to demonstrate that the alleged failure to warn was the 
proximate cause of the fire. (Aplt. App. at 119-24). 
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27. The Tabors and Farmers appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and after oral argument, the Tenth Circuit certified certain questions to this 
Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Utah should reject any exception to its current, traditional, general rule of 
non-liability of a successor entity. The vast majority of jurisdictions have rejected 
alternative theories of successor liability for many important reasons which spring from 
the consensus that they are "unsound policy.2" Utah should continue to follow the 
majority rule by rejecting the non-traditional product line and continuity of enterprise 
theories. 
Utah should not create and impose an independent duty to warn on 
successor entities to an asset purchase to warn customers of defects in products 
manufactured by predecessor entities. Utah products liability law already addresses 
liability for entities within the chain of distribution of a product, see Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. 
v.Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) (adopting Section 402 A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts as Utah law, imposing strict products liability on "[o]ne who sells" a 
product). For entities outside of the chain of distribution, Utah tort law already makes 
2
 The Tenth Circuit noted in is Certification that "[t[he drafters of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts expressly considered and rejected these new exceptions, noting that they 
represent a minority view and are unsound policy." {See Certification p. 3, fn. 2) 
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clear that a special relationship i ni ist e xist bet w een pat ties befoi • = • a di it) i :t ia) be imposed, 
especially when the alleged duty is based upon an alleged omission by the defendant, such 
as a failure to warn. See Webb v. University of Utah 2005 UT 80, \ 9 125 P.3d 906. 
Then i •; no tia il lii ni iilr jiii! iniposr >i in w iltilv in llliis < ase- especialI". \\ licit* llicre is no 
relationship at all between the Tabors and Metal Ware, much less a special and 
continuing one. 
: n independent duty to warn is to be imposed on successor entities to an 
asset purchase, uian si;-, n lid follow the ji n isdictioi is tl mt ii i lpose a iiai i o vv l j tailoi e d 
independent duty to warn that arises only when the following standard is satisfied: (1) 
there is a significant, independent relationship between the asset purchase successor and 
fttet ustomei nlh nwns niii possessr. III.; pit itimi ,hip is n sp>t\;iciI one 
based upon substantial and meaningful contact; and
 v3) the relationship developed as an 
independent one, based upon a business relationship that developed exclusive of the asset 
pi n c J lase si lccessioi I Factors to considei ii i determining whether this standard of an 
independent, special relationship exists between the asset pi ircl iase si lccessoi ai id tl ic: 
customer < >r o\v tu-: »f the product include, but are not limited to: (1) the asset purchase 
successor H -v's succession to service contracts; (2) coverage of the particular product 
possessed by the customer by a service contract; (JJ ' service of tl le pi odi ict I: ] - tl le 
asset purchase successor; (4) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the defect; and 
(5) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the customer's locatioi i In the instant 
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case, no independent duty to warn could be imposed because there was no relationship at 
all between Metal Ware and the Tabors. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Utah Has Never Recognized an Exception to the Traditional Rule of Non-
Liability of a Successor Entity to an Asset Purchase, and Utah Should 
Continue to Follow its Prior Precedent, Which is the Majority Rule, and 
Continue to Reject the Non-Traditional Product Line and Continuity of 
Enterprise Theories. 
The Tenth Circuit has asked this court to determine whether Utah would 
adopt any non-traditional theory regarding successor liability. The Certification reads: "If 
Utah law would extend successor liability to Metal Ware merely because (1) it purchased 
American Harvest's assets, and (2) it continued selling the product line of food 
dehydrators, then the Tabors may have a claim against Metal Ware. On the other hand, if 
Utah recognizes only the standard four exceptions to successor non-liability, the district 
court properly granted summary judgment." (Certification at p. 6.) 
A. Traditional Rule of No Successor Liability to an Asset Purchaser 
The Tenth Circuit correctly noted that "[t]he general rule is that a successor 
corporation is not responsible for the torts of a predecessor entity." (Certification p. 4). 
This traditional rule of successor liability and its four exceptions are set forth in The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 12 (2003). Section 12 provides: 
A successor corporation or other business entity that acquires assets of a 
predecessor corporation or other business entity is subject to liability for 
harm to persons or property caused by a defective product sold or otherwise 
distributed commercially by the predecessor if the acquisition: 
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(a) is accompanied by an agreement \\n Iht ,\w\ ci -mil to ns^um*1 sin h 
liability; or 
(b) results from a fraudulent conveyance to escape liability for the debts or 
liabilities of the predecessor; or 
(c) constitutes a consolidation or merger with the predecessor; or 
(d) results in the successor becoming a continuation of the predecessor. 
Id. 
The Tenth Circuit also correct!] noted tl lat' " ' 1 1 ic: • I Itah Coi u I: of \ppeals 1 las 
recognized this general rule of successor nonliability, subject to four exceptions." 
(* emilcat ionp. 4 .) I hat is, 
[W]here one company sells or otherwise transfers all its assets 
to another company the latter is not responsible for the debts 
and liabilities of the transferor except where: (1) the purchaser 
expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts; (2) the 
transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the seller 
and purchaser; (3) the purchasing corporation is merely a 
continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) the transaction 
is entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for such 
debts. 
Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, In. 1999 IJT App 2 3 0 , 1 1 5 , 986 P.2d 748, 752. The 
general 11lie of successor nonliability has been confirmed to be the km r TTfnh as recently 
as 2004. See Decius v. Action Collect > ; . /» ,. /i/< ^ . • . • J* 
956. In Decius, the Utah Court of Appeals held that "Utah has not ventured past the 
traditional bounds oi (he mere continuation test/ ' id. at f 10, and that the mere 
continuation exception "deni;t i ul'i \i i uiiiinun nknlih ul slm k, tlnt't lui, .iml slockliuld* t , 
and the existence of only one corporation at the completion of the transfer." Id. The 
court expressly "decline[d] to expand successor liability" where there was no continuing 
owners:! rip by tl ic sz it t ic shai el ic »ldei s of tl ic old company in the new company Id. at f 18. 
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The U.S. District Court properly determined that "no published Utah 
decision has hinted at adopting the two additional exceptions [product line and 
continuity], much less done so." (Aplt. App. at 65, Order at p. 13.) That ruling was made 
by the U.S. District court before Decius was issued, which explicitly rejected the 
continuity of enterprise exception and reaffirmed adherence to the general rule of 
nonliability. Thus, it is even clearer now, after Decius, that the majority, traditional rule 
is the law in Utah and should remain so. 
Utah law has never held that an entity that purchases the assets of anther 
entity is liable for injuries caused by defects in a product sold or manufactured by the 
asset selling predecessor. The great majority of other jurisdictions also follow this 
longstanding, traditional rule. See, e.g, Leannis v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 
(7th Cir. 1977) ("The general rule in the majority of American jurisdictions . . . is that a 
corporation which purchases the assets of another corporation does not succeed to the 
liabilities of the selling corporation."). 
In the instant case, none of the four (4) Maoris exceptions was ever raised 
in the U.S. District Court. Instead, plaintiffs and co-defendants ShopKo and Englewood 
Electric proposed that Utah should or would adopt the non-traditional product line or 
continuity of enterprise theories. For reasons more fully described below, the traditional 
rule of Maoris and its four (4) exceptions are preferable to the non-traditional product line 
and continuity of enterprise exceptions which most jurisdiction have explicitly rejected. 
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The Tenth Circuit notes that despite tl le aforei nei it ioi led state of ( Itah h t < , tl le '' I aboi s 
nonetheless argue that Utah courts would expand liability to include Metal Ware since it 
continued to sell American Harvest 's dehydrator products." (Certification p . 5.) 
B . 
The product line theory posits that where one entity a c q u i r e 
substantially all of the assets of another entity and continues to undertake essentially the 
same manufacturing operation as the selling entity, the purchasing entity is liable in strict 
products liabilit) r lot tin1 iii|mi<"i \ JUM d In, lln (IHMIIIH I III.IIIIII.IC hirnl in • nld In inlic 
predecessor entity. See 63 A m J u r . 3 d Products Liability § 138 (1997). The Tenth Circuit 
asks i his court whether Utah would adopt the product line theory, stating as follows; "If 
* i CM ild extei id successoi liabilit) to f letal Vi 7are i nerel> becai ise (1) it pui cl lased 
American Harves t ' s assets, and (2) it continued selling the product line of food 
dehydrators, then the Tabors may have a claim against Metal Ware On the other hand, if 
I Itah i ecognizes oi ily tl te stai icic u d four exceptions to successor non liability, the district 
court properly granted summary judgment ." (Certificatioi i a tp .6 ) I I'tal i si ioi ild reject 1:1 le 
product line theory just as the majority of other jurisdictions have rejected it. 
Since the product line theory was first adopted in California, see Ray v. 
Alad Corp., 560 P.22d 3 (Cal. 1977), oni\ 
those jurisdictions have placed important limits on the theory.3 i111 other jurisdictions 
3
 These states are: New Je r sey (Ramirez v. AmstedIndus., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 
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have adhered to the general rule of Section 12 of the Restatement, and have rejected both 
the product line and continuity of enterprise exceptions when given the opportunity.4 
1981); (but see possible limit to "product line" exception recognized in dicta in Leo v. 
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d 96, 100-01 (3d Cir.1994) (applying New Jersey law) 
("It seems apparent that, except perhaps in design defect cases, a defect in a product when 
the manufacturer distributed the product is likely to manifest itself and cause injury within 
a reasonable time after the product is manufactured. Accordingly, as a practical matter, 
successor liability under Ramirez is likely to be imposed in most cases, if at all, for a 
limited period.")); New Mexico (Garcia v. Coe Manufacturing Co., 933 P.2d 243 (N.M. 
1997)); Pennsylvania (Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1981)); Washington (Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash.1984)). 
4
 See, e.g., Arkansas (Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F.Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. 
Ark. 1988)); Reed v. Armstrong Cork Co., 577 F. Supp. 246, 247- 48 (E.D. Ark. 1983)); 
Colorado (Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Colorado 
law); Johnston v. AmstedIndus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992)("The 
vast majority have declined to [adopt the product line theory]")); Florida (Bernard v. Kee 
Mfg. Co., 409 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 1982)); Georgia (Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328 
S.E.2d 726 (Ga. 1985)); Illinois (Gonzalez v. Rock Wool Eng'g & Equip. Co., 453 N.E.2d 
792 (111. App. Ct. 1983)); Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 395 N.E.2d 19 (111. App. Ct. 
1979)); Iowa (Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1996)); Kentucky 
(Conn v. Fales Div. ofMathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying 
Kentucky law)), Pearson v. Nat'I Feeding Systems, Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 51-52 (Ky. 2002) 
(citing eleven jurisdictions rejecting the product line theory); Maryland (Nissen Corp. v. 
Miller, 594 A.2d 564 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991)); Massachusetts (Guzman v. 
MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E. 2d 929 (Mass. 1991)("[t]he majority of State courts that have 
addressed the product line theory have declined to adopt it," and citing cases)); 
Minnesota (Costello v. Unipress Corp., 1996 WL 106215 (Minn. Ct. App., Mar. 12, 
1996); Cooper v. LakewoodEngineering & Mfg. Co., 45 F.3d 243 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(applying Minnesota law)); Missouri (Bozell v.H&R 1871, Inc., 916 F.Supp. 951 (E.D. 
Mo. 1996)); Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(applying Missouri law)); Nebraska (Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 
481 (Neb. 1982)); North Carolina (Budd Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., Inc., 370 S.E.2d 
267 (N.C. Ct. App.1988)); North Dakota (Downtowner Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 
347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D.I984)); Ohio (Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Co., 617 N.E. 2d 1129 
(Ohio 1993)); Oklahoma (Goucher v. Parmac, Inc., 694 P.2d 953 (Okla.Ct.App.1984)); 
South Dakota (Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mack, Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986)); 
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The traditional mlr <>l IIHUIII Imhililv In in .ihiH pinch,isr sue cessoi i«, 
founded on the longstanding rule of products liability law that only one w ho 
manufactures, sells, or distributes a product is liable for a product defect. See 
Restatement ( I fulfill ml! flu 1 .i\\ of 1 oil' I'MMIIU ( I mhililv ^ I J unl. a ( I'J'W), see also 
Bernard v. KeeMfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982) (holding that "extending 
liability to the corporate successor is not consistent with at least one major premise of 
strict liability, which is to place responsibility for a defective product on the manufacturer 
who p lac ed tl mt pi c cii ict int : : oi i lmerce") ^ si iccessoi has not in ' it sd I isage of tl le 
product or implied its safety, it has not created the risk, and it has never been in a position 
to eliminate the risk. Thus, because an asset purchase successor like Metal Ware never 
munul.'U'linnl sold ar (lisdnlmilril (he (lefediu* ptodiu I I lie assel purchase successor is 
not liable in strict products liability. 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §12, cint b., discusses 
varioi is compelling reasons for the general i tile set forth n i Macri s. "I linking liability of 
successor corporations to tin* < in utitsfaiuvs desetibei 1 in ("inlioti 1 ", | is Niippoilul In 
Texas (Griggs v. CapitolMach. Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); 
Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)); Vermont 
(Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126 (Vt. 1984)); Virginia (Harris v. T.I., Inc., 
413 S.E.2d 605 (Va. 1992)); West Virginia (Jordan v. Ravenswood Aluminum Corp., 
455 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 1995) (per curiam)); Wisconsin (Fish v. AmstedIndus., Inc., 376 
N.W.2d 820 (Wis. 1985)); District of Columbia (LeSane v. Hillenbrand Indus., 791 F. 
Supp. 871, 873-74 (D. D.C. 1992) (applying District of Columbia law)); Virgin Islands 
(Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986, V. I.)). 
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fairness and efficiency considerations." Id. "[IJmposing liability on the piecemeal 
purchase of productive assets would, for no compelling reason, impede the free 
alienability of corporate assets, thereby discouraging shareholder investment of capital 
and increasing social costs." Id. "Extending successor liability beyond the [four 
exceptions to the general rule] would, in the judgment of most courts, be unfair and 
socially wasteful." Id. This is so because "the imposition of strict liability on [asset 
purchase] successor corporations is inconsistent with the principle of products liability 
law that imposes responsibility on the party who created the risk and was in a position to 
prevent its occurrence." Id. 
Moreover, a majority of courts have concluded that the 
substantial social costs of a more expansive liability rale 
would be incurred without actually benefitting very many tort 
plaintiffs. In most instances, the magnitude of future liability 
for products distributed pre-transfer is difficult, if not 
impossible, to assess. As a majority of courts have 
recognized, the result of imposing successor liability as a 
general rule would be to depress the prices for transferred 
assets to the point that piecemeal disposition of assets, which 
clearly would not subject the buyers to liability, would be a 
preferable alternative to the sale of assets as part of a going 
concern. In that event, the products liability claimant harmed 
by a pre-transfer product defect would still run the risk of 
ending up with an uncollectible judgment. The benefits to 
society of preserving predecessor's assets as a going concern 
would be sacrificed, with no commensurate benefits to tort 
claimants. 
* * * 
And even if a more expansive successor liability rule did not 
invariably lead to piecemeal asset transfers, such a liability 
rule would depress the prices received for going-concern 
transfers to an extent that would threaten to undermine the 
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o: : * - iing corpoi atioi is 
* * * 
A more expansive successor liability rule might threaten 
shareholders' investments by significantly restraining 
corporate assets transfers, thereby tending to frustrate 
corporation law's objective of encouraging shareholder 
investment. 
Id. 
Some courts have recognized that imposition of successor liability on small 
corporations who acquire assets through asset purchases could spell financial disaster for 
tl v'i i vr/«* i* . . : MI tu. ^ec utsi, iscnitu,: . ALL MJg. ( - - ' 
So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Ma. i^i)
 vsmall businesses; \ ,••:-. M . .i 
annihilation"), The traditional rule of non-liability benefits society as a whole. The 
traditional rule "derives primarily from the law governing corporations, which favors the 
free alienability of coi poi ate assets at id lit nits si mi eholdei s' exposures to liability in order 
to facilitate the formation and investment of capital." Restatement, § 12, cmt. a. 
In view of the foregoing, "[s]everal courts and commentators have 
* • * M Mini • • - ems set "forth | in Ihc I Restatement commentary] can best be 
addressed by legislation." Id., Reporters' Note, cmt. b. kauoiu« «•• >-" ^ n it 
quotes two leading cases on this issue, Fish v. AmstedIndus., Inc., 376 N.W .2d 820 (Wis. 
1985), and Leannis v. Cincinnati, Inc.. ^ i M > j 07 7 \ which support the 
legislative appn >ac 11. 111 /• Vs // , I1 in • '• • - • -1 - .: - • e 
legislature is in a better position to make broad public policy decisions in actions based on 
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products liability law." Fish, 376 N.W.2d at 829. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
likewise concluded that because "courts are ill-equipped . . . to balance equities among 
future plaintiffs and defendants . . . such broad public policy issues are best handled by 
legislatures with their comprehensive machinery for public input and debate." Leannis, 
565 F.2d at 441. Finally, in the recent case of Winsor v. Glasswerks PHXt LLC, 63 P.3d 
1040 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), the court refused to adopt either product line or continuity of 
enterprise, and set forth four reasons why the legislature is better equipped to address 
such issues: (1) the "core issue is one of policy," (2) predictability in commerce should 
be encouraged, (3) the exceptions "modify or minimize fundamental principles of tort 
liability," and (4) "our present rule already allows for liability against certain successor 
corporations." Ttf. at 1047-1050. 
In sum, judicial opinions generally articulate six (6) reasons for rejecting 
the non-traditional theories: First, whether the long-standing rule of successor non-
liability should altered by changing the law regarding corporate succession is better left to 
the Legislature. Second, the successor corporation that purchased the predecessor's 
assets did not realize the profit for the product. Third, the successor corporation cannot 
be said to have created the risk presented by the product because it did not manufacture 
the product. Fourth, the successor corporation is unable to improve the defective product 
that was already sold into the market by the predecessor corporation. Fifth, the successor 
corporation did not represent that the product was non-defective and safe by selling the 
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negotiated and paid for the goodwill or reputation of the predecessor 's product line, and 
to hold the successor liable for defects in products manufactured by the predecessor 
would IK: lorcing the successor to pay twice lor the goodwill of the predecessor. See, e.g., 
Pearson, 90 S W 3d 46, 51 52 (K y 2002); h mes t ' h 4m s : m "\ fi u iune & 1 >res s C t >
 :, 320 
N.W.2d 481 , 484 (Neb. 1982) (discussing five reasons for rejecting the product line and 
continuity of enterprise theories); Fish ^ 7 ^ N W.2d at 827-28; Johnston, 830 P.2d at 
1 ; w • * i , I  1 1 4 , 5 ( f l Cir ) (1 : ILK • 
and Indiana would reject the theories). 
Utah should continue to follow the majority rule and reject both the product 
line and continuity of enterprise exceptions. It is noteworthy that Appellants abandoned 
their prodi ict lii le argi iments on appeal to till ic ' I ei ith Cii ci lit ' I I :; tl leoi ) is 
unavailing to them for that reason as well. Notwithstanding their acknowledgment that 
the theory is unavailing to them, because this case is before this Court on certification, 
tl lis ( " >nn shoi ild still i i lake it cleai tl tat tl le pi odi ict lii le tl le orj is i lot tl le la'vv ii I 1 1 tall i 
^ "Continuity of Enterprise" Theory 
Most courts address the continuity of enterprise theory in conjunction wi tli 
tl ic pi odi i ::t lii ic tl ieor>
 ; Vltl ton igl i tl ic ' I abot s otil> raised tl le coi itini lit) of enterprise 
theory on appeal, because courts often give the same reasons for rejecting tlic t\\ o 
theories, the reasons for rejecting the continuity of enterprise theory are the same reasons 
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for rejecting the product line theory. See e.g, Fish v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 
820, 829 (Wis. 1985) ("We decline to adopt the 'expanded continuation' exception to 
nonliability for the same reasons that we declined to adopt the product line exception/') 
Instead of arguing the traditional Macris exceptions to the U.S. District 
Court, the plaintiffs argued the continuity of enterprise theory. The U.S. District Court 
correctly held that Metal Ware cannot be liable under either the product line or continuity 
of enterprise theory because Utah has never adopted either theory as Utah law. This 
Court should make it clear that Utah rejects the continuity of enterprise theory, as has 
already been suggested by the Utah Court of Appeals in both Macris and Decius. The 
same reasons given above for rejecting the product line theory also constitute valid 
reasons for rejecting the continuity of enterprise theory. See Restatement (Third) of the 
Law of Torts, Product Liability § 12 cmt. a, cmt. b, and Reporters' Note, cmt. b. 
Rationale (1998); see also, Pearson, 90 S.W.3d 46, 51-52 (Ky. 2002); Jones v. Johnson 
Machine & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982) (discussing reasons for rejecting 
the product line and continuity of enterprise theories); Wins or v. Glasswerks PHX, LLC, 
63 P.3d 1040, 1046-1050 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Fish, 376 N.W.2d at 827-28; Johnston, 
830 P.2d at 1144; Guzman, 567 N.E.2d at 931. 
Utah has never adopted the continuity of enterprise or product line theory. 
Indeed, the district court noted that "no published Utah decision has hinted at adopting 
the two additional exceptions [of product line and continuity of enterprise], much less 
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enterprise theory was actually rejected by the Utah Court of Appeals . See Decius v. 
Action Collection Service, Inc., 2004 U T A p p 484, 105 P.3d 956. Because the continuity 
o f i T i l n p n s r (hettiy is hul I l|,ih L n , llic I I N hi ;(rii I I \\\w\ piopeilv i c j a l a l il and 
declined to apply it to impose a duty on Meta l Ware . See Tucker, 645 F.2d at 624-1S 
(citing Leannis, 565 F.2d at 439, for the proposit ion that a federal court should not 
impose the law of one state upon another). Moreover , the I I S . District Court correctly 
chance. 
As noted above, after the U .S . District Court held that the continuit r 
enterpi ise tl leoi y vv as i i ::)t tl le la >.< \ • ii i. • Appeals issued Decius v. 
Action Collection Service, Inc., 2004 U1 Apr 484, IOD K J d ^ D O , Iejecting the contini iit> 
of enterprise theory. In Decius, the Utah Court of Appeals reiterated that \ i.i!i follows 
the traditional rule of successor non-liability and the traditional exceptions. 2004 U T App 
484 at. 'Tf8, 105 I * 3d 956 I lie « : :»'i n t expi essly stated tl mt'" I ftal 11 n is not vei iti ired f: i ist tl :t i 
traditional bounds of the mere continuation test ." Id. at \ . J. It then discussed the 
continuity of enterprise theory. The Utah Court of Appeals pointed out that "[o]nly a 
n nil IOI il:y of ji ii isdictioi is 1 la/v e adopted tl ic [coi itii n iit> of ei iterpi ise tl leory ] ; 
Fish v. AmstedIndustries, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 828 (Wis. 1985), for the proposit ion that 
the legislature is better suited to change the law of successor liability. Decius, 2004 U T 
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App 484 at fflf8-15, 105 P.3d 956. In the end, Decius expressly "decline[d] to expand 
successor liability." Id. at f 18. 
In sum, the U.S. District Court correctly noted that neither the continuity of 
enterprise theory nor the product line theory are the law in Utah, as "no published Utah 
decision ha[d] hinted at adopting the two additional exceptions [of product line and 
continuity of enterprise], much less done so." (Order, Docket Entry #98 at p. 13). 
Subsequent to that ruling by the U.S. District Court in this case, Utah explicitly and 
affirmatively rejected the continuity of enterprise theory in Decius. This Court should 
continue to follow the majority rule and simply make it clear that Utah would not adopt 
the continuity of enterprise theory. 
II. Utah Law Should Not Impose an Independent Duty to Warn on a Successor 
to an Asset Purchase. 
As set forth above, Utah has continued to follow the general rule of 
non-liability of a successor to an asset purchase. To date, Utah has never adopted an 
independent failure to warn theory, and there is no need to create such a tort now. A 
decision to expand or modify products liability law is better left to the legislature given 
the broad policy implication and the possible ramifications that such a change may have 
on other areas of the law. This is discussed in Section II. A. below. 
Even if this Court were to adopt a theory imposing an independent duty to 
warn on a successor entities, such a duty should only arise in very narrow 
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circumstances-none of which would create the duty in this case Other ji n isdictioi is tl iiat 
have adopted the independent duty to warn on an asset purchase successor impose the 
duty in narrow circumstances where there is an independent, special relationship between 
this three-part standard, five factors are considered in other jurisdictions. The three-part 
standard and five factors used in considering this standard are discussed in Section II.B 
b e l o w . ' • . . " , . . • . 
A. No Need to Judicially Create .1111 I ndependent I >n("» ' to Warn. 
There is no need for this Court to create the tort of an independent duty to 
warn. As explained previously, "the legislature is in a better position to make broad 
|ni l i | |M>||< y divhiion-. iii at tioici. IMSI ' I I on piodiu Is IMIMI I I ' , law h\h i hiisicd hulii* 
Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 829 (Wis. 1985). (discussing better option of legislative change to 
products liability laws in context of product line and continuity of enterprise theories); see 
itlso Lctmnis v. Cincinnati, hu , Mo V .1<\ 4 V , 111 1 ' 1 'n I1) >"«) (same). As the 
Restatement commentary explains, courts are ill eqi lipped to ei ' all late ai id balance tl ic: 
ramifications that changes to products liability law will have on corporate law and other 
IN HIK DI law therefore this issue is best handled by the legislature with its ability to 
invite public input and debate. Restate! 1 ic: 1. it ( 1 1 lit d) of tl: ic I -aw of 1 01 ts § 1 2 , R epoi tci s' 
Note, cmt. b. Rationale 
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Judicially creating the independent duty to warn theory in Utah is also 
unnecessary given longstanding Utah law that a special relationship is necessary to 
impose a duty. Utah products liability law imposes strict liability upon manufacturers, 
wholesalers, and retailers in the chain of distribution. See Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v.Armco 
Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) (adopting Section 402 A of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts as Utah law, and imposing strict products liability on "[o]ne who sells" a 
product); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-1 to -7 (2006) (outlining statutory modifications and 
additions to Utah products liability law). Existing Utah tort law also addresses whether 
an independent duty to warn is owed by entities outside of the chain of distribution-
based upon whether a special relationship exists. 
Utah law is already clear that "[t]he law imposes upon one party an 
affirmative duty to act only when certain special relationships exist between the parties." 
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986). Moreover, a special 
relationship must exist when the alleged duty is based upon an alleged omission by the 
defendant, such as a failure to warn. See Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, ^ f 9-
10, 125 P.3d 906. ("[A]n omission or failure to act can generally give rise to [a duty] 
only in the presence of some external circumstance-a special relationship). 
Because Utah law is already clear that a duty exists only if a special 
relationship exists between two parties, it is unnecessary to judicially create an 
independent duty to warn in this circumstance involving an alleged failure to warn by an 
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asset purchase successor to a possessor of a product. Because products liability applies to 
those in the chain of distribution, and Metal Ware is not in the chain of distribution, 
products liability need not apply. Instead, general tort law applies. Utah tort law already 
addresses this requirement of a special relationship before a duty may be imposed. There 
is no need to judicially create a new tort for this circumstance. 
It would also be imprudent to attempt to set forth all the contours and 
nuances of such an independent duty to warn in the abstract. Whether a special 
relationship exists must be considered on a case by case basis. In this case there was no 
relationship at all between the asset purchase successor (Metal Ware) and the customers 
who purchased the product from the predecessor and possessed the product (the Tabors). 
Certainly the Court can declare that no duty exists in this circumstance where there was 
no relationship between the asset purchase successor and possessor of the product. 
However, this Court should not attempt to outline, in the abstract, all of the factors and 
circumstances by which an asset purchase successor would owe a duty of care to a 
customer of a predecessor manufacturer in possession of a product manufactured by that 
predecessor. It would be more prudent to declare that no duty exists in this case where 
there is no relationship, and then allow the common law to develop as other cases and 
factual scenarios present themselves. 
Utah would not be the first jurisdiction to decline to adopt the independent 
duty to warn in the context of a consumer product. See Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive 
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Corp., 78 Cal. App.4th 681, 695, 697-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ("[w]e reject plaintiffs1 
theory of independent liability [under the independent duty to warn theory], and stating 
that even if the court were "inclined to [adopt the theory as California law], it is not 
warranted in the circumstances of this case.") (citing Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 
866 (9th Cir.1980) ("surmisfing] that. . . California law imposes no duty to warn under 
[similar] circumstances" involving a consumer pharmaceutical drug). 
There is especially no need to create an independent duty to warn where an 
individual injured by a product already has recourse against entities within the chain of 
distribution. Where a plaintiff has no recourse because no entity within the chain of 
distribution is a viable party, the independent duty to warn has more appeal. However, in 
cases like the instant case where entities within the chain of distribution are viable parties, 
and the plaintiff has obtained, through settlement, recourse from a wholesaler and retailer 
who sold the product, there is no need to impose a duty on an entity that is not part of the 
chain of distribution. 
B. Analytical Framework for the Independent Duty to Warn 
If this Court decides to create and impose an independent duty to warn on 
post-sale asset purchases, it should consider both the standard and factors set forth by 
other jurisdictions. The jurisdictions that have imposed an independent duty to warn on a 
successor to an asset purchase have articulated the following standard: in order to impose 
an independent duty to warn, there must be an independent, special relationship between 
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the asset purchase successor and the customer or owner of the product - the person with 
possession of the product. See, e.g., Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 84 (3d Cir. 
1986); Gee, 615 F.2d at 866; see also Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 610 (Va. 1992); 
see generally 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 138 (1997). 
In understanding the duty, it is important to understand the three elements 
of the standard: (1) the relevant relationship - between the actual owner or possessor of 
the product and the asset purchase successor; (2) whether this relationship is a special one 
as determined by whether there is substantial and meaningful contact; (3) whether the 
relationship has developed as an independent one, based upon a business relationship that 
has developed exclusive of the asset purchase succession. These three elements of the 
standard are discussed in Section II.B.l. 
Other jurisdictions have set forth five factors to consider in analyzing the 
standard and determining whether an independent, special relationship exists between the 
asset purchase successor and the customer or owner of the product: (1) the asset purchase 
successor entity's succession to service contracts; (2) coverage of the particular product 
possessed by the customer by a service contract; (3) actual service of the product by the 
asset purchase successor; (4) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the defect; and 
(5) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the customer's location. Harris, 413 
at 610; Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 577 (10th Cir. 1989); Niccum v. Hydra Tool 
Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn.1989); Wessinger v. Vetter Corp., 685 F. Supp.769, 
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774 (D. Kan. 1987); Stratton v. Garveylnt'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1296 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1984); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc^ 347 N.W.2d 118,125 (N.D. 1984) 
Gonzalez v. Rock Wool Engineering and Equip. Co., Inc^ 453 N.E.2d 792, 795 (111. Ct. 
App. 1983); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); Leannais, 565 F.2d at 
442; see generally 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 139 (1997). These factors are 
discussed in Section II.B.2. 
1. Three-Part Standard for Imposing an Independent Duty to Warn 
a. The relevant relationship is with the actual owner or possessor of 
the product, not a retailer or wholesaler that sold the product 
The relevant special relationship is between the successor entity and the 
owner who possesses the product, not between the successor entity and a business 
customer such as a retailer or wholesaler that sold the product to the possessor. This 
special relationship must be a direct and continuing relationship with the possessor of the 
product. 
This first element of identifying the relevant relationship is critical in a 
consumer product case like the instant one. In a case involving a consumer product, the 
Ninth Circuit explained the nature of this independent, special relationship that must exist 
between the successor entity and the owner or purchaser of the product. In Gee v. 
Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1980), predecessors manufactured and distributed a 
drug. Id. at 860. An asset purchase successor entity became aware of the drug's tendency 
to cause disease. Id. at 865. The family of an injured user of the drug claimed an 
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independent duty to warn. Id. at 866. The court held that no independent duty to warn 
was owed by the successor to the end consumer - the actual person in possession of the 
drug. The court noted that "[a] common thread running through decisions imposing a 
duty to warn upon a successor corporation has been the continuation of the relationship 
between the successor and the customers of the predecessor." Id. The successor owed no 
duty to warn because "[t]here [were] no facts in the record to indicate that [any successor 
entity] had any relationship with users of [the drug]." Id. at 866. 
Other cases involving consumer products agree that the pertinent 
relationship is between the asset purchase successor and the actual possessor of the 
product, as opposed to between the asset purchase successor and business customers who 
are wholesalers or other pass-through distributors who are no longer in possession of the 
product. See Wessinger v. Vetter Corp., 685 F. Supp. 769, 770 (D. Kan. 1987) (holding 
no independent duty to warn in case involving consumer motorcycle part where asset 
purchase successor offered to provide service and maintenance to retail sellers who were 
business customers of both manufacturer and then asset purchase successor; no duty to 
warn was owed because the asset purchase successor "merely supplied retailers, not retail 
customers, with replacement parts and repair kits[, and] there was no indication that [the 
manufacturer] had a relationship with retail customers, that [the asset purchase successor 
maintained the relationship or began its own relationship as to customers in general[.])" 
(emphasis added); Tracey v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 745 F. Supp. 1099, 1111-
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1113 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (explaining in context of defective shotgun that succession by asset 
purchase alone does not impose an independent duty to warn, "emphasizing] that the 
relationship which gives rise to this duty is between the successor corporation and the 
particular allegedly defective product/' and holding that no duty to warn was owed 
because even though the asset purchase successor performed maintenance on the model 
of shotgun involved and provided spare parts for that model, there was "no evidence that 
[asset purchase successors] performed service on the particular shotgun involved in this 
case or that defendants were aware of the location of the shotgun or the location of its 
owner"). 
Nearly all of the cases discussing the independent duty to warn involve 
industrial machinery. Only a handful of cases involve consumer goods. As a result, the 
independent duty to warn theory is tailored to the factual circumstances involving the sale 
and purchase of industrial machinery through an asset purchase, followed by a continued 
service relationship on that specific machine. The theory is less congruent to 
circumstances like the instant case involving consumer goods, where a product is 
purchased by a consumer through a chain of distribution involving a manufacturer, 
wholesaler, and retailer; and instead of having a personal relationship between the owner 
or possessor of the product, the asset purchaser has a business relationship with the 
companies in the chain of distribution. 
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Some courts fail to make clear this aspect of the independent duty to 
warn-i.e., that the relevant relationship is between the successor entity and the owner who 
possesses the product, and not between the successor entity and a business customer such 
as a retailer or wholesaler that sold the product to the ultimate consumer or possessor. 
Some courts genetically state that the duty exists if there is an independent relationship 
developed by the asset purchase successor with the "customers" of the predecessor. The 
case of Patton v. TIC United Corp., 11 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 1996), uses the following 
more accurate language: "The Kansas high court recognized that a manufacturer's post-
sale duty to warn ultimate consumers who purchased the product who can be readily 
identified or traced . . . ." Id. at 1239 (emphasis added; internal quotation omitted). In 
the "Certification of Questions of State Law" in the instant case, the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals correctly focuses on the relevant "customer" of the predecessor by its multiple 
references to "product owners" and "consumers" when discussing the post-sale duty to 
warn. {See Certification pp. 8-9; emphasis added). 
Thus, the duty to warn, if it were to be adopted, runs to the ultimate 
consumer as opposed to a wholesaler or retailer. Any continued business relationship 
with middlemen or retailers also utilized by with the predecessor is "[m]ere casual 
contact" between the successor entity and the clients of the manufacturer, and is 
insufficient to impose the duty. Harris, 413 S.E.2d at 610; see also Patton at 1240. 
While some courts might fail to make the relevant relationship clear, many courts have 
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explained that communications and contacts with distributors are insufficient to establish 
the type of special relationship necessary to impose an independent duty to warn. See 
Kaleta v. Whittaker Corp., 583 N.E.2d 567, 574-75 (111. Ct. App. 1991); Wessinger, 685 
F. Supp. at 770-71; Tracey, 745 F. Supp. at 1100-02. For the reasons explained above, 
this is because such communications relate to the wrong relationship. 
In this case there was no relationship at all between the asset purchase 
successor (Metal Ware) and the customer that owned and possessed the product (the 
Tabors). Metal Ware never contacted the product owner, and had no idea the Tabors 
existed at all, much less that they owned any American Harvest product. The relevant 
relationship is between Metal Ware and the Tabors; and there was no relationship. 
Hence, no duty would arise in this case even if the independent duty to warn was the law 
in Utah. 
b. A "special" relationship requires substantial and meaningful contact 
The relevant relationship between the customer and successor entity must 
also be "special," not a relationship that exists simply because wholesalers and retailers 
continue to do business after the asset purchase. The independent, special relationship 
should arise only in narrow circumstances when there is substantial and meaningful 
contact between the successor entity and the owner or purchaser of the product. Harris, 
413 at 610; Polius, 802 F.2d at 84. This relationship between the product owner and 
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successor entity must be significant enough to impose an independent duty based upon a 
new, independent relationship between them. 
Courts have noted various circumstances that are insufficient to constitute 
substantial or meaningful contact or a special relationship. First, mere knowledge by an 
asset purchase successor of a defect in its predecessor's product does not establish the 
special relationship and result in a duty to warn. See Tucker v. Paxson Mack Co., 645 
F.2d 620, 621-27 (8th Cir. 1981) (concluding no independent duty to warn because the 
bare assertion that successor knew of the defective nature of the product and its location 
did not show the necessary relationship); Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., Inc., 239 F. 
Supp. 247, 249-50 (N.D. Ohio 1965); see also Tracey, 745 F. Supp. at 1100-02. Second, 
the duty also does not arise merely because an asset purchase successor conducts the same 
business activity with the predecessor's customer. See Harris, 413 S.E.2d 605 at 610. 
"[T]he mere continuation of a name and acquisition of good will" is insufficient to 
impose an independent duty to warn, Travis, 565 F.2d at 448; see also Geef 615 F.2d at 
866, cited in Florom, 867 F.2d at 577 (explaining that succession alone does not impose a 
duty to warn.) In other words, the continuity of business by retailers and wholesalers with 
the asset purchase successors is insufficient. To impose an independent duty to warn 
based upon succession would swallow the general rule of successor non-liability. 
Clearly in this case, where there was no relationship at all between Metal 
Ware and the Tabors, there was obviously no a "special" and "continuing" relationship. 
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However, even if a service call had been made to the Tabors by Metal Ware, some 
jurisdictions would still conclude that this was insufficient. See Travis, 565 F.2d at 445-
49 (holding no duty because no special relationship existed where employee of successor 
made a service call on owner, but this did not create the requisite "ongoing or continuous" 
special relationship); Kaleta, 583 N.E.2d at 574-75 (holding no duty because there was 
"no evidence of a continuing relationship between [successor] and [purchaser and owner 
of the product] with respect to servicing the 660 line of beltloaders," even where 
successor notified owner it would honor the manufacturer's warranty and told owner to 
relay any problems it had with product, because "such communications and contacts alone 
fail to constitute evidence of a continuing relationship between [the product owner and 
the successor]/') 
c. The relationship must be independent of the asset purchase 
This special relationship must also be an independent relationship that 
exists based upon a business relationship exclusive of the asset purchase succession. 
Without an independent, special, ongoing relationship based upon substantial and 
meaningful contact between the successor and the owner of the product, the duty to warn 
would arise in any circumstance in which a successor has any dealings with its 
predecessor's customers. See e.g. Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1296 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1984) "There must be some basis in such a relationship of benefit to the 
successor entity and solid connection with the predecessor entity. Were it not so, a duty 
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to warn would arise in which a successor has any dealings with its predecessor's 
customers." id.; see also Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Service, Inc., 512 F.Supp. 176 
(E.D.Pa. 1981). 
2. Factors Considered by Courts in Analyzing Whether the 
Standard is Satisfied 
Jurisdictions that have imposed the independent duty to warn evaluate a list 
of factors, some of which are congruent with this case involving a consumer product, and 
some of which are not. These factors include the following: (1) the asset purchase 
successor entity's succession to service contracts; (2) coverage of the customer's 
allegedly defective product by a service contract; (3) actual service of the product by the 
asset purchase successor; (4) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the defect; and 
(5) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the customer's location. Harris, 413 
S.E.2d at 610; Florom, 867 F.2d at 577; Wessinger, 685 F. Supp.at 774; Stratton, 676 
P.2d at 1296; Gonzalez, 453 N.E.2d at 795; Travis, 565 F.2d at 448. 
As noted previously, these factors are applicable in cases involving 
industrial or manufacturing products that are sold through an asset purchase, and less 
congruent to cases like the instant one involving a consumer product. The independent 
duty to warn should be narrowly tailored and the application of these factors results in the 
independent duty to warn occurring in narrow circumstances. Some courts have gone so 
far as to hold that where the asset purchase successor never provided service to the actual 
defective product itself, no independent duty to warn existed. See, e.g., Harris, 413 
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S.E.2d at 610 ("[c]ourts in jurisdictions that recognize the duty to warn have 
overwhelmingly rejected claims based upon the duty when there is no service obligation 
or there has been no actual service of the product."); J & B Co. v. Bellanca Aircraft 
Corp., 911 F.2d 152, 154 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that where the product was never 
serviced by the asset purchase successor that there could be no liability under the 
independent duty to warn theory as a matter of law). Even one jurisdiction that adopted 
the continuity of enterprise theory construes the independent duty to warn narrowly. See 
Pelc v. Bendix Machine Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614, 621 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). That 
case explained that succession to an asset purchase alone is insufficient to impose the 
independent duty to warn, and held that where a successor to an asset purchase knew 
machine existed, but did not know of the defect and never serviced the machine, there 
was no independent duty to warn. Id. See also Foster v. Cone-BlanchardMach. Co., 
597 N.W.2d 506, 512-13 (Mich. 1999) (holding no duty because no special relationship 
existed between successor and predecessor's customers where there was "no evidence 
that [the successor entity] actually or by agreement serviced the machine in question," 
despite the fact that successor had access to predecessor's customer lists and successor 
may have solicited continuing business from predecessor's customers); Again, if this 
independent duty were not narrowly tailored, the duty to warn would arise in any 
circumstance in which a successor has any dealings with its predecessor's customers. See 
Stratton v. Garvey Int'l Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1296 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984). At least one 
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other jurisdiction that adopted the liberal theories is not liberal in imposing the 
independent duty to warn on successor entities, but only impose the duty in narrow 
circumstances. Jacobs, 512 F.Supp. at 178-86 (holding no duty where there was no 
evidence that successor "ever serviced or repaired a tip tank that had been manufactured 
by the [predecessor]/' even though successor had contact with customers of predecessor 
for questions or spare parts, this casual contact was insufficient to create the special 
relationship, because if this were the case "a duty to warn would arise in any circumstance 
in which a successor has any dealings with the predecessor's customers"); Tracey, 745 F. 
Supp. at 1100-02 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
The above-illustrated factors are not the ultimate test, but a framework for 
analyzing the ultimate standard: whether there is a special, independent relationship 
based upon substantial and meaningful contact between the successor and the owner of 
the product - the actual possessor of the product - sufficient to impose an independent 
duty to warn. See, e.g., Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 
125 (N.D. 1984). 
Finally, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly notes that if the 
independent duty to warn is to be imposed at all, the defects for which a warning would 
be required must be "recently discovered." Florom at 577. Such a requirement means that 
Metal Ware would have no liability in this case because the defect was not "recently 
discovered," but rather was known well before the 1997 asset purchase, and had even 
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been the subject of a Consumer Products Safety Commission recall in 1995. The Tenth 
Circuit indicates its disapproval of the application of the duty to Metal Ware when it 
notes that the U.S. District Court held that Utah law would impose the duty "even though 
(1) American Harvest was aware of the defect before it sold the dehydrator to the tabors 
and (2) the USCPSC had imposed a recall obligation on American Harvest." See 
Certification p. 6.5 
While it is the role of this Court to answer the certified questions and not 
apply the law to the facts of this case and decide this case, the end result should be that 
Metal Ware owes no duty. The particular machine owned by the Tabors was never under 
a service obligation, and it was never serviced by Metal Ware. Metal Ware had no idea 
the Tabors had purchased any American Harvest product, and also did not know where 
the product was located. Moreover, the defect was clearly not "recently discovered," but 
rather was well known many years before, and was the subject of a USCPSC recall, 
meaning that a "warning" had already been given about the product during the recall 
process. Given these facts, the independent duty to warn should not have been imposed 
on Metal Ware. 
5
 The Tenth Circuit correctly notes that the U.S. District Court "did not address 
whether the defect should be considered "recently-discovered," thereby triggering a duty 
to warn." Certification at p. 7. 
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CONCLUSION 
Utah should continue to adhere to the traditional, majority rule as set forth 
in Maoris. Both of the minority, non-traditional exceptions are ill-conceived and cause 
far greater problems than they would remedy. Additionally, the independent duty to warn 
should not be adopted, but even if it is it should be narrowly tailored as it has been in 
other jurisdictions. Irrespective of the outcome of any of the certified questions, Metal 
Ware was properly dismissed by the U.S. District Court. 
Dated this 26th day of September, 2006. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Brian C. Webber 
Attorneys for The Metal Ware Corporation 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
y^0sm 
REST 3d TORTS-PL § 12 Page 1 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 12 (1998) 
c 
Restatement of the Law -- Torts 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 
Current through April 2006 
Copyright @ 1998-2006 by the American Law Institute 
Chapter 3. Liability Of Successors And Apparent Manufacturers 
§ 12. Liability Of Successor For Harm Caused By Defective Products Sold 
Commercially By Predecessor 
Link to Case Citations 
A successor corporation or other business entity that acquires assets of a 
predecessor corporation or other business entity is subject to liability for harm 
to persons or property caused by a defective product sold or otherwise distributed 
commercially by the predecessor if the acquisition: 
(a) is accompanied by an agreement for the successor to assume such 
liability; or 
(b) results from a fraudulent conveyance to escape liability for the debts 
or liabilities of the predecessor; or 
(c) constitutes a consolidation or merger with the predecessor; or 
(d) results in the successor becoming a continuation of the predecessor. 
Comment: 
a. History- The rule that a corporation or other business entity is not, in the 
absence of the circumstances described in Subsections (a) through (d), subject to 
liability for harm caused by defective products sold by a corporation from which 
it purchases productive assets derives from both products liability and corporate 
law principles. When the alleged successor purchases the assets piecemeal with 
little or no further continuity of operations between the two corporations or 
other business entities, the nonliability of the alleged successor derives 
primarily from the fact that the successor is not within the basic liability rule 
in § 1 of this Restatement: "one ... who sells or distributes a defective product 
is subject to liability for harm ... caused by the defective product." (Emphasis 
added.) Thus, when one corporation commercially sells products, some of which are 
defective, and later transfers its productive assets to another corporation that 
uses those assets to manufacture products of its own, the purchaser of the assets 
is not liable for harm caused by a defective product sold earlier by the 
transferor because the transferee did not "sell or distribute" the defective 
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product that caused the harm. When the alleged successor receives value in the 
form of the transferor's goodwill and continues to manufacture products of the 
same sort as manufactured earlier by the predecessor, and thus to some extent 
constitutes a continuation of the predecessor, the general rule of nonliability 
derives primarily from the law governing corporations, which favors the free 
alienability of corporate assets and limits shareholders' exposures to liability 
in order to facilitate the formation and investment of capital. 
When the transferor goes out of business upon, or shortly after, a transfer of 
productive assets, the rights of plaintiffs injured by defective products sold 
earlier by the transferor may be adversely affected. For tort plaintiffs who have 
existing judgments outstanding against the predecessor at the time of transfer and 
dissolution, the law governing corporations and other business entities provides, 
within limits, legal protection. Creditors, including tort creditors, who hold 
existing judgments against a corporation that is in the process of transferring 
its assets and going out of business may satisfy those claims out of the proceeds 
from the transfer of assets. Moreover, if the proceeds from the transfer of assets 
are distributed to shareholders of the transferor corporation in violation of 
applicable state corporation law or fraudulent transfer law, existing creditors of 
the corporation may pursue the proceeds in the hands of the transferor's 
shareholders. These rules, in some states expressed in statutes, are designed to 
protect, within the limits of practicality, creditors who are identifiable at the 
time of the transfer of the predecessor's assets to the successor corporation and 
the transferor's dissolution. The same principles have been applied to the 
transfer of assets of proprietorships, partnerships, and other business entities. 
Tort claimants who, as a result of defective products sold by a predecessor 
corporation, seek recovery only after transfer of assets to a successor 
corporation often face difficulties in attempting to bring their claims within the 
foregoing legal rules. Their claims typically accrue after the predecessor 
corporation has lawfully distributed to its shareholders the proceeds from the 
transfer of assets and has ceased to exist. Under these circumstances, tort 
claimants who were not existing creditors at the time of the transfer of assets 
ordinarily have no recourse against the predecessor's shareholders. Unless they 
can pursue their claims against the successor corporation, or can reach other 
funds provided by existing insurance or by a statute, their only practical remedy 
lies with retailers and wholesalers in the predecessor's distributive chain, who 
may not be available as a practical matter. Statutes and judicial precedents 
governing the rights of creditors after a corporate assets transfer and 
dissolution generally do not address this problem of post-transfer claims accrual. 
Few precedents recognize tort claims against the successor corporation for harm 
caused by defective products sold by the predecessor unless the transaction by 
which productive assets are acquired meets criteria established by one of several 
traditional exceptions. These exceptions apply generally to creditors whose claims 
accrue after dissolution of the predecessor, and are not limited to products 
liability claimants. They fall into two basic categories: those in which some 
conduct of the successor, in addition to acquiring the predecessor's assets, 
justifies holding the successor responsible (the successor either contractually 
agrees to be liable or knowingly participates in a fraudulent asset transfer); and 
those in which the successor itself can be said to have sold or distributed the 
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defective products because the successor constitutes the same juridical entity as 
the predecessor, perhaps in somewhat different form (the successor merges with, or 
constitutes a "mere continuation" of, the predecessor). Under this Section, a 
products liability claimant has a recognized claim against a successor for harm 
caused by defective products distributed by the predecessor in these circumstances. 
A minority of jurisdictions impose liability on a successor corporation based 
on a broader concept of continuation of the business enterprise, even when there 
is no continuity of shareholders, officers, or directors. Some courts hold that 
the continuation of a predecessor's product line by the successor is sufficient to 
support imposition of successor liability for harm caused by defects in products 
sold before the assets transfer. 
b. Rationale. Limiting the liability of successor corporations to the 
circumstances described in this Section is supported by fairness and efficiency 
considerations. An alleged successor that purchases the predecessor's productive 
assets piecemeal, other than as part of a going concern, cannot, by that fact 
alone, be said to have either manufactured or sold defective products distributed 
by the predecessor before the transfer of assets. In the absence of circumstances 
in which the successor could be said to constitute a continuation of the 
predecessor, or somehow to have prejudiced subsequent tort plaintiffs by its own 
pre-acquisition conduct, imposing liability on a business entity that did not make 
or distribute the defective products that caused harm could be justified only 
because it increases the amount of money available post-acquisition out of which 
to satisfy plaintiffs' claims. But that alone cannot be justification for 
successor liability. Thus, imposing liability on the piecemeal purchase of 
productive assets would, for no compelling reason, impede the free alienability of 
corporate assets, thereby discouraging shareholder investment of capital and 
increasing social costs. 
Imposing liability on successor corporations constitutes acceptable public 
policy when the successor either agrees to be liable or is implicated in the 
transfer of assets in a way that, without such liability, would unfairly deprive 
future products liability plaintiffs of the remedies that would otherwise have 
been available against the predecessor. Subsections (a) through (d) describe the 
types of corporate asset transfers that have been determined to justify imposing 
liability on the successor. Subsection (a) recognizes that contractual promises by 
the successor to pay subsequent tort claims, for which promises the successor has 
presumably been compensated, should be honored. Subsection (b) provides that when 
a business entity makes a fraudulent transfer in which the transferee is 
implicated, successor liability is appropriate for the same reason that liability 
would be imposed in favor of other creditors. Thus, a predecessor may arrange an 
asset transfer at an artificially deflated price, accompanied by an agreement by 
the successor to compensate either the predecessor, its owners, or its managers in 
ways that escape easy detection; or a successor may knowingly participate in an 
asset transfer coupled with a liquidating dividend by the predecessor to its 
shareholders for the purpose of leaving tort plaintiffs without remedy. If those 
transfers are fraudulent under applicable state law, imposing tort liability on 
the transferee for having knowingly participated in such transfers is justified. 
2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
REST 3d TORTS-PL § 12 Page 4 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 12 (1998) 
Subsections (c) and (d) deal with successors that, in a real sense, did produce 
and distribute the product that caused the harm, though in a somewhat different 
organizational form. Subsection (c) deals with the transferor corporation that 
merges by law or in fact into the transferee, typically with no substantial change 
in corporate management or ownership. Subsection (d) concerns the transfer of 
corporate assets in the context of a transaction involving only a change in 
organizational form. In both these situations, liability for harm caused by 
defective products distributed previously should be imposed on the business entity 
that emerges from the transaction. In substance, if not in form, the post-transfer 
entity distributed the defective products and should be held responsible for them. 
If mere changes in form were allowed to control substance, corporations intending 
to continue operations could periodically wash themselves clean of potential 
liability at practically zero cost, in sham transactions, and thereby unreasonably 
undermine incentives for producers and distributors to invest in product safety 
and unfairly deny tort plaintiffs adequate remedies when defective products later 
cause harm. 
A small minority of courts have fashioned successor liability rules more 
advantageous to products liability claimants than the rules stated in this 
Section. Those minority rules, in effect, extend the "change in form only" 
exception just described to include circumstances in which the successor continues 
a product line previously distributed by the predecessor. The minority position is 
based on the belief that a successor who purchases productive assets should not be 
allowed to benefit from receiving the goodwill and reputation of the predecessor's 
business without the burden of responding in tort to claims for harm caused by 
products sold by the predecessor prior to transfer. An argument advanced to 
support this minority view is that holding successors liable reduces the price 
that predecessors receive for transferring assets, thereby helping to strengthen 
incentives for the managers to invest in care before the transfer of the business. 
This reasoning has proven unpersuasive to a substantial majority of courts that 
have considered the issue. Extending successor liability beyond the exceptions set 
forth in Subsections (a) through (d) would, in the judgment of most courts, be 
unfair and socially wasteful. Post-transfer plaintiffs harmed by pre-transfer 
defects have a right to expect that a transfer of assets will not be allowed to 
prejudice financially their chances of satisfying a judgment; they have no 
legitimate claim that the transfer should increase those chances over what they 
would have been if no transfer had occurred. In the likely event that the 
successor is financially stronger than the predecessor, imposing a broader 
liability for pre-transfer product defects would unjustifiably increase the funds 
available to those injured by such defects compared with what would have been 
available to them if no transfer had taken place. 
As courts have recognized, it would be difficult, and often impossible, to 
implement and administer a liability rule that attempted to limit post-transfer 
plaintiffs' rights to an aggregate amount equal to the net value of the 
predecessor before transfer. Tort judgments are imposed independently of one 
another, in various jurisdictions; no central authority exists to assure that, in 
the aggregate, tort judgments do not exceed a predetermined total amount. Thus, 
the expanded successor liability rules in a minority of states, not limited to 
time-of-transfer net value, replace one risk of injustice--that the assets 
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transfer may unfairly reduce plaintiffs* recoveries in cases that do not satisfy 
the traditional exceptions (reflected in Subsections (a) through (d))-- with 
another, possibly greater, injustice: that the transfer may give tort plaintiffs a 
windfall at the expense of companies who engage in asset transfers and, in turn, 
at the expense of the consuming public. 
Moreover, a majority of courts have concluded that the substantial social costs 
of a more expansive liability rule would be incurred without actually benefiting 
very many tort plaintiffs. In most instances, the magnitude of future liability 
for products distributed pre-transfer is difficult, if not impossible, to assess. 
As a majority of courts have recognized, the result of imposing successor 
liability as a general rule would be to depress the prices for transferred assets 
to the point that piecemeal disposition of assets, which clearly would not subject 
the buyers to liability, would be a preferable alternative to sale of the assets 
as part of a going concern. In that event, the products liability claimant harmed 
by a pre-transfer product defect would still run the risk of ending up with an 
uncollectible judgment. The benefits to society of preserving the predecessor's 
assets as a going concern would be sacrificed, with no commensurate benefits to 
tort claimants. 
And even if a more expansive successor liability rule did not invariably lead 
to piecemeal asset transfers, such a liability rule would depress the prices 
received for going-concern transfers to an extent that would threaten to undermine 
the objectives of the law governing corporations. One of the purposes served by 
the corporate structure is to provide limitation and certainty of risk to 
shareholders in order to encourage capital formation. Thus, the shareholders' 
initial risk is limited to the value of their shares of stock and they are able to 
withdraw from an investment by sale of the stock without incurring future 
potential liability. A more expansive successor liability rule might threaten 
shareholders' investments by significantly restraining corporate assets transfers, 
thereby tending to frustrate corporation law's objective of encouraging 
shareholder investment. 
Some critics of the majority rule argue that, when the successor continues to 
manufacture the same products as the predecessor, often under the same trademark, 
consumers have legitimate expectations that the successor will stand behind the 
predecessor's products. Disappointing these expectations is unfair, according to 
the critics, quite apart from the effects of successor liability upon the 
formation of capital. But this argument overlooks the reality that the 
predecessor's products that cause harm in these cases were distributed prior to 
the assets transfer, when there could be no reliance by consumers on the financial 
viability of the successor. One cannot logically rely on post-transfer 
expectations regarding the successor to justify the imposition of liability on the 
successor for pre-transfer distributions by the predecessor. 
c. Nonliability in the absence of special circumstances. In the absence of the 
circumstances described in Subsections (a) through (d), a successor company that 
buys productive assets from another company is not liable for harm caused by a 
defective product sold or otherwise distributed by the predecessor prior to the 
successor's acquisition of assets. When the assets are purchased piecemeal, the 
alleged successor did not "sell or distribute" the product under the liability 
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rule stated in § 1; and attempts to establish continuation of the corporate entity 
are recognized only under the terms set forth in this Section. The successor is 
liable under §§ 1-4 for harm caused by defective products it sells after 
acquisition. In the absence of the circumstances described in this Section, 
however, the successor is not liable for defective products sold by another prior 
to that time. 
Illustrations: 
1. ABC Corp., which manufactures and sells lawn mowers, transfers all its 
assets to XYZ Corp., a manufacturing corporation with different officers, 
directors, and shareholders, for cash. ABC then dissolves, distributing the 
proceeds of the sale to its shareholders. ABC complies with all statutes 
governing its dissolution, and none of the exceptions in this Section applies. 
XYZ retains most of ABC's employees and managers and continues to manufacture 
lawn mowers, some of which are the same as previously manufactured by ABC. A 
defective lawn mower made and distributed by ABC prior to the transfer of 
assets to XYZ harms a user three years after the transfer. XYZ is not subject 
to liability for the harm to the user of the lawn mower. 
2. The same facts as Illustration 1, except that a defective lawn mower made 
and distributed by XYZ after the transfer of assets harms a user three years 
after the transfer. XYZ is subject to liability for the harm to the user of the 
lawn mower. 
d. Agreement for successor to assume liability. When the successor agrees to 
assume liabilities for defective products sold by its predecessor, liability is 
imposed under Subsection (a) in accordance with the terms of the agreement. As a 
general matter, contract law governs the application of this exception. Courts 
have interpreted general statements that the successor agrees to assume the 
liabilities of the predecessor to include products liability claims even though 
the agreement makes no specific mention of products liability. However, assumption 
of products liability is not implied by the successor's assumption of specific 
duties with regard to product service or replacement. 
Illustration: 
3. The same facts as Illustration 1, except that the transfer-of-assets 
agreement contains a promise by XYZ to assume all of ABC's liabilities. XYZ is 
subject to liability for the harm to the user of the lawn mower. 
e. Fraudulent transfer in order to avoid debts or liabilities. Subsection (b) 
incorporates by reference the relevant state law governing fraudulent conveyances 
and transfers. In contexts other than successor products liability, fraudulent 
transfers can be set aside on behalf of existing creditors of the transferor. In 
this context, fraudulent transfers provide a basis for holding successors liable 
to post-transfer tort plaintiffs. The fact that general creditors are pursuing 
remedies against the transferee does not prevent tort plaintiffs from pursuing 
remedies under Subsection (b). What constitutes a fraudulent conveyance or 
transfer is determined by reference to applicable state law. 
Illustration: 
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4. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that the transfer of 
assets by ABC to XYZ is made as part of a plan between ABC and XYZ to leave 
tort claimants harmed by ABC's defective products without enforceable remedies. 
If a transaction constitutes a fraudulent transfer under applicable state law, 
XYZ is subject to liability for harm to the user of the lawn mower. 
f. Consolidation or merger. When statutory consolidation or merger of two 
corporations takes place, products liability devolves on the successor corporation 
under Subsection (c). A more difficult question is whether, absent statutory 
merger, a de facto merger has taken place. Local law governing de facto mergers is 
determinative. Whether a de facto merger under Subsection (c) has occurred 
generally depends on whether: (1) there is a continuity of management, employees, 
location, and assets; (2) the successor corporation acquires the assets of the 
predecessor with shares of its own stock so that shareholders of the transferor 
corporation become shareholders of the transferee corporation; (3) the predecessor 
corporation ceases its ordinary business operations immediately or shortly after 
the transfer of assets; and (4) the successor assumes those liabilities and 
obligations of the predecessor necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of the 
normal operations of the predecessor. 
Illustrations: 
5. The same facts as Illustration 1, except that the transfer of assets is 
for stock in XYZ and constitutes a statutory merger of ABC and XYZ under 
applicable state law. XYZ is subject to liability to the user of the lawn mower. 
6. The same facts as Illustration 1, except that the transfer of assets is 
for stock in XYZ, with which ABC redeems its own stock from its shareholders. 
ABC then ceases to operate its own business, which XYZ resumes with the same 
management and employees, at the same location. If it is determined under 
applicable state law that a de facto merger between ABC and XYZ has occurred, 
XYZ is subject to liability for harm to the user of the lawn mower. 
g. Continuation of the predecessor. The exception recognized in Subsection (d) , 
referred to by many courts as the "mere continuation" exception, applies when 
there has been a formal redesignation of the predecessor corporate entity but 
little or no change in underlying substance. The most important indicia of 
continuation, in addition to the continuation of the predecessor's business 
activities, are common identities of officers, directors, and shareholders in the 
predecessor and successor corporations. A minority of jurisdictions recognize a 
broader exception, referred to as the "continuity of enterprise" exception, that 
imposes liability on the successor for continuing the business activities of the 
predecessor even when the corporate form of the successor is different from the 
predecessor. This Section does not follow that minority position. 
Illustration: 
7. The same facts as Illustration 1, except that XYZ is a corporation with 
the same officers, directors, and shareholders as ABC. After the assets 
transfer, XYZ continues the same manufacturing and distribution operations as 
ABC did previously. If XYZ is determined to constitute a "mere continuation" of 
ABC under Subsection (d), XYZ is subject to liability to the user of the lawn 
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mower. 
h. Necessity for the predecessor to transfer all of its assets and go out of 
business. Almost all of the reported decisions applying the bases of successor 
liability stated in this Section involve predecessors that transfer all of their 
assets to successors and then dissolve or otherwise cease operations. Indeed, the 
predecessor's termination is the circumstance that, as a practical matter, most 
often gives rise to the need for a post-transfer tort plaintiff to look to the 
successor for recovery. The exceptions set forth in Subsections (c) and (d), 
merger and continuation, most frequently have significance when the predecessor 
has transferred all of its assets to the successor and, at least formally, has 
ceased to exist. But there is no reason that the exceptions set forth in 
Subsections (c) and (d) might not arise in connection with the transfer of a 
division of a large company, leaving the company in existence after the transfer. 
And the exceptions in Subsections (a) and (b) could arise in connection with 
transfers involving less than all of the predecessor's assets where the 
predecessor continues in existence after the transfer. 
i. Relationship between the rule in this Section and the successor's 
independent duty to warn. This Section deals with a successor's liability for harm 
caused by the predecessor's defective products and is not premised on 
post-transfer wrongdoing by the successor itself. For the rules governing the 
liability of a successor for its own post-transfer failure to warn its 
predecessor's customers, see § 13. 
REPORTERS' NOTE 
Comment b. Rationale. In a much-cited case, Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 
F.2d 75 (3d Cir.1986) (applying Virgin Islands law), the court stated that the 
imposition of successor liability on a company that has merely purchased the 
assets of a predecessor for cash and does not otherwise fall within the stated 
exceptions would encourage the dissolution of a financially troubled corporation 
by piecemeal sale of assets rather than as a going business concern. In this event 
the plaintiff would not be able to reach the assets when the accident occurred 
years after dissolution. The end result would be the needless destruction of an 
ongoing business enterprise with no net advantage to anyone. Other courts have 
observed that the imposition of successor liability on small corporations could 
spell financial disaster to them. See, e.g., Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co. Inc., 409 
So.2d 1047 (Fla.1982); DeLapp v. Xtraman Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Iowa 1987); 
Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 570 (Md.1991); Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 
438 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn.1989). These courts have concluded that the imposition of 
strict liability on successor corporations is inconsistent with the principle of 
products liability law that imposees responsibility on the party who created the 
risk and was in a position to prevent its occurrence. See also Johnston v. Amsted 
Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141 (Colo.Ct.App.1992); Downtowner v. Acrometal Prods., 
Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D.1984); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 827 
(Wis.1985). 
Corporate successor liability has been the subject of considerable law review 
commentary. See, e.g., Phillips, Product Continuity and Successor Corporation 
Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 906 (1983) (the article contains an exhaustive 
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listing of law review literature; author supports the "product line" exception); 
Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Product 
Liability Claimants, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 17 (1986) (criticizing the rationale 
offered by courts and commentators in support of the liability based on "product 
line" or "continuity of business enterprise" and suggesting a statutory solution 
to the problem by requiring dissolving corporations to provide products liability 
plaintiffs with adequate protection); Note, A Policy Analysis of a Successor 
Corporation's Liability for Its Predecessor's Defective Products When the 
Successor Has Acquired the Predecessor's Assets for Cash, 71 Marq. L. Rev. 815 
(1982) (author criticizes the rationale offered to support expansive rules 
imposing liability on successor corporations and suggests expansion of independent 
duty to warn and fraudulent transfer category when the successor had actual or 
constructive knowledge of product defects); Rogala, Nontraditional Successor 
Product Liability: Should Society Be Forced to Pay the Cost?, 68 U. Det. L. J. 37 
(1990) (economic analysis supports the retention of the four basic exceptions and 
the rejection of "product line" and "continuity of enterprise" theories); Comment, 
Successor Liability: The Debate Over the Continuity of Enterprise Exception in 
Ohio Is Really No Debate at All, 21 Ohio N.L. Rev. 297 (author criticizes both 
"product line" and "continuity of enterprise" exceptions and predicts that Ohio 
will follow four traditional exceptions). Much of the law review commentary 
supports liberalizing the rules imposing liability on corporate successors. The 
articles acknowledge, however, the overwhelming judicial rejection of the 
liberalizing rules. It is interesting that, after an early spurt of cases in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s arguing for more expansive liability, courts have 
refused to impose liability unless the plaintiff is able to come within the four 
traditional exceptions. See Green, Successors and CERCLA: The Imperfect Analogy to 
Products Liability and an Alternative Proposal, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 897, 909-10 
(1993); Henderson and Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An 
Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 479, 492 and n.64 (1990) . 
Several courts and commentators have recognized that the problems set forth in 
this Comment can best be addressed by legislation. For an insightful analysis and 
recommendation, see Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory 
Reform to Protect Product Liability Claimants, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 17 (1986) 
(criticizing the rationale offered by courts and commentators in support of 
liability based on "product line" or "continuity of business enterprise" and 
suggesting a statutory solution to the problem by requiring dissolving 
corporations to provide products-liability plaintiffs with adequate protection). 
Courts have repeatedly espoused the same view. See, e.g., Fish v. Amsted Indus., 
Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 829 (Wis.1985): 
We conclude that the legislature is in a better position to make broad 
public policy decisions in actions based on products liability law. 
[Citation omitted]. The questions concerning the effect on the manufacturing 
business, the potential size and economic strength of successor 
corporations, the availability of commercial insurance and the cost of such 
insurance are all questions that ... the legislature is in a better position 
to ascertain. 
A similar sentiment was expressed in Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 
441 (7th Cir.1977): 
In recent years, for a variety of reasons, many have thought it necessary 
to turn to the courts in search of solutions to social problems. Courts are 
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ill-equipped, however, to balance equities among future plaintiffs and 
defendants.... [S]uch broad public policy issues are best handled by 
legislatures with their comprehensive machinery for public input and debate. 
See also Myers v. Putzmeister, Inc., 596 N.E.2d 754 (111.App.1992); Welco Indus, 
v. Applied Co., 617 N.E.2d 1129 (Ohio 1993); Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press 
Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104 (111.App.Ct.1982); Holifield v. Setco Indus., Inc., 168 
N.W.2d 177 (Wis.1969), overruled on other grounds, Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 
335 N.W.2d 578 (Wis.1983). 
One possible statutory approach might be to require that whenever a product 
manufacturer transfers a business or a product line as a going concern, some form 
of bond or other security must be posted by the predecessor manufacturer in an 
amount not to exceed the net value of the predecessor at time of transfer. The 
value of the bond or other security would be available to future tort plaintiffs 
to satisfy claims for harm caused by previously distributed defective products. 
The posting of such a security would, under terms of the statute, protect the 
successor from future liability for previously distributed products in excess of 
the value of the security. Presumably, obligations on the bond would be limited in 
time. Future plaintiffs injured by products previously distributed by the 
predecessor would be no worse off financially than if the transfer of assets had 
not occurred. The limit based on the value of the predecessor at the time of 
transfer, with an appropriate time limit, would render more calculable the amount 
of the security required, in contrast to the difficulty of calculating future 
liabilities without such limits under the more expansive successor liability rules 
applied in a minority of jurisdictions. The value of the predecessor's product 
line as a going concern, whenever that value exceeds the cost of the security 
against future liability, would be preserved without allowing the transfer of 
assets to prejudice tort plaintiffs' chances of recovery. 
Comment c. Nonliability in the absence of special circumstances. The following 
jurisdictions have limited the liability of successor corporations to the four 
exceptions set forth in § 12 and would reject both the "continuity of enterprise" 
approach (Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich.1976)) and the 
"product line" exception (Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal.1977)). See, e.g., 
Arkansas (Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F.Supp. 619, 623 (E.D.Ark.1988); Reed v. 
Armstrong Cork Co., 577 F.Supp. 246, 247- 48 (E.D.Ark.1983)); Colorado (Florom v. 
Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir.1989) (applying Colorado law); Johnston v. 
Amsted Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141 (Colo.Ct.App.1992)); Florida (Bernard v. Kee 
Mfg. Co., 409 So.2d 1047 (Fla.1982)); Georgia (Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328 
S.E.2d 726 (Ga.1985)); Illinois (Gonzalez v. Rock Wool Eng'g & Equip. Co., 453 
N.E.2d 792 (111.App.Ct.1983); Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 395 N.E.2d 19 
(111.App.Ct.1979)); Iowa (Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1996)); 
Kentucky (Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir.1987) 
(applying Kentucky law)); Maryland (Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564 
(Md.Ct.Spec.App.1991)); Massachusetts (Guzman v. MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E.2d 929 
(Mass.1991)); Minnesota (Costello v. Unipress Corp., No. C6-95- 2341, 1996 WL 
106215 (Minn.Ct.App., Mar. 12, 1996); Cooper v. Lakewood Engineering & Mfg. Co., 
45 F.3d 243 (8th Cir.1995) (applying Minnesota law)); Missouri (Bozell v. H & R 
1871, Inc., 916 F.Supp. 951 (E.D.Mo.1996); Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, 
Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir.1988) (applying Missouri law)); Nebraska (Jones 
v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb.1982)); North Carolina (Budd 
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Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., Inc., 370 S.E.2d 267 (N.C.Ct.App.1988); Comment, 
Beyond Budd Tire: Examining Corporate Successor Liability in North Carolina, 30 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 889 (Winter 1995)); North Dakota (Downtowner Inc. v. Acrometal 
Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D.1984)); Ohio (Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Co., 
617 N.E.2d 1129 (Ohio 1993)); Oklahoma (Goucher v. Parmac, Inc., 694 P.2d 953 
(Okla.Ct.App.1984)); South Dakota (Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 
N.W.2d 515 (S.D.1986)); Texas (Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287 
(Tex.Ct.App.1985); Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.Ct.App.1986)); 
Vermont (Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126 (Vt.1984)); Virginia (Harris 
v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605 (Va.1992)); West Virginia (Jordan v. Ravenswood 
Aluminum Corp., 455 S.E.2d 561 (W.Va.1995) (per curiam)); Wisconsin (Fish v. 
Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis.1985)); District of Columbia (LeSane v. 
Hillenbrand Indus., 791 F.Supp. 871, 873-74 (D.D.C.1992) (applying District of 
Columbia law)); Virgin Islands (Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75 (3d 
Cir.1986, V. I.)). Only a few states appear to have adopted liability based on the 
successor corporation's continuation of the predecessor's line of products: 
California (Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal.1977)); New Jersey (Ramirez v. 
Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J.1981); (but see possible limit to "product line" 
exception recognized in dicta in Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d 96, 100-01 
(3d Cir.1994) (applying New Jersey law) ("It seems apparent that, except perhaps 
in design defect cases, a defect in a product when the manufacturer distributed 
the product is likely to manifest itself and cause injury within a reasonable time 
after the product is manufactured. Accordingly, as a practical matter, successor 
liability under Ramirez is likely to be imposed in most cases, if at all, for a 
limited period.")); New Mexico (Garcia v. Coe Manufacturing Co., 933 P.2d 243 
(N.M.1997)); Pennsylvania (Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106 
(Pa.Super.Ct.1981)); Bogart v. Phase II Pasta Machs., Inc., 817 F.Supp. 547 
(E.D.Pa.1993)); Washington (Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash.1984); Fox 
v. Sunmaster Prods., Inc., 821 P.2d 502 (Wash.Ct.App.1991) (the continued product 
line must be the one that harms the plaintiff)). Although the product line 
exception is still theoretically viable in Pennsylvania, if a plaintiff has a 
possible remedy against the predecessor, a recent opinion held the exception could 
not be invoked. LaFountain v. Webb Indus. Corp., 951 F.2d 544 (3d Cir.1991). 
In an earlier draft of these Reporters' Notes, New Jersey was categorized as a 
jurisdiction that employs a very liberal test for corporate successor liability, a 
test premised on maximizing recovery rather than on evidence of express agreement 
to be liable or substantial deprivation of remedies for plaintiffs against the 
predecessor corporation. In support of this position Pacius v. Thermtroll Corp., 
611 A.2d 153 (N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div.1992), was cited. In that case, the court held 
that any transfer of assets or use of the predecessor's goodwill entailed a de 
facto merger that, in turn, triggered successor liability. Id. at 157. Elaborating 
on the policy underlying this holding, the Pacius court quoted Rawlings v. DM 
Oliver Inc., 159 Cal.Rptr. 119, 124 (1979) for the following proposition: 
Fundamental fairness has been sought through a balancing of the rights of 
the injured party against the rights of those engaged in business, including 
the latter»s reasonable commercial expectations. Placing the economic burden 
on those jbest able to pay for those costs, while permitting the transfer to 
those most culpable is consistent with the equitable considerations inherent 
in the resolution of the difficult problems which have been judicially 
posed. The thrust from our high court as a matter of first priority has been 
2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
REST 3d TORTS-PL § 12 Page 12 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 12 (1998) 
to maximize recovery for the victim. 
Id. at 157 (emphasis added). 
Recently, however, New Jersey has reigned in the "deep pocket" approach set 
forth above by the Pacius court. In Saez v. S & S Corrugated Paper Machinery Co., 
695 A.2d 740 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1997), the court expressed disagreement both with 
the decision of the Pacius court and with this Restatement's earlier 
characterization of New Jersey law. The court first noted that, in contrast to the 
holding in Pacius, in order for a successor corporation to be liable under New 
Jersey law, the corporation must not only benefit from the predecessor's goodwill 
but must also continue to manufacture the predecessor's product. Id at 16. 
Moreover, the court stated that the question to answer in determining whether 
successor liability has been triggered is "not whether there was 'any benefit that 
the successor obtain[ed] from the acquisition of the assets of its predecessor' or 
if the successor eliminated a competitor [since] [s]o broad a test would be no 
test at all." Id. 
Several other jurisdictions have imposed liability based on a continuation of 
the predecessor's business even when there was no stock transfer or a common 
identity of corporate directors. See, e.g., Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons, Co., 
369 So.2d 781, 785 (Ala.1979); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 
(Mich.1976); MacCleery v. T.S.S. Retail Corp., 882 F.Supp. 13 (D.N.H.1994). 
Comment d. Agreement for successor to assume liability. 
1. For general authority that agreements to assume liability will be enforced 
in favor of plaintiffs with products liability claims, see cases cited in the 
Reporters' Note to Comment b-
2. General assumption of a predecessor's liability, even without specific 
mention of products liability, will be interpreted to include liability for 
products liability claims. See, e.g., Bouton v. Litton Indus., Inc., 423 F.2d 643 
(3d Cir.1970) (applying New York law); Grugan v. BBC Brown Boveri, Inc., 729 
F.Supp. 1080 (E.D.Pa.1990). If the contractual obligation as to the successor's 
assumption of products liability is subject to conflicting interpretations, the 
issue is for the trier of fact. See, e.g., Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 
862-63 (9th Cir.1980) (applying California law); Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 
570, 574-76 (10th Cir.1989) (applying Colorado law); Davis v. Loopco Indus., Inc., 
609 N.E.2d 144 (Ohio 1993). 
3. Contractual agreements by the successor to repair or service a product sold 
by the predecessor do not amount to an agreement to assume products liability for 
injuries caused by the predecessor's defective products. See, e.g., Schwartz v. 
McGraw-Edison Co., 92 Cal.Rptr. 776 (Cal.Ct.App.1971) (disapproved on other 
grounds in Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal.1977)); Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 
F.Supp. 526 (E.D.Pa.1971) (applying New York law). Whether agreements to service a 
predecessor's products may create an independent duty to warn about defects is 
discussed in connection with § 13. 
Comment e. Fraudulent transfer in order to avoid debts or liabilities. For the 
reason set forth in the Comment, this exception has rarely been used to impose 
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successor liability for products liability claims. However, in Schmoll v. AC & S, 
Inc., 703 F.Supp. 868 (D.C.Or.1988), the court found that a complex corporate 
restructuring was undertaken to avoid both pending and future liability to persons 
who were certain to suffer asbestos-related illness and was thus the functional 
equivalent of a fraudulent transfer. See also Morgan v. Cavalier Acquisition 
Corp., 432 S.E.2d 915 (N.C.Ct.App.1993) (reversing summary judgment when 
plaintiff's evidence raised a question of fact as to whether the defendant had 
purchased assets from the predecessor corporation in order to avoid creditors' 
claims); Budd Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., 370 S.E.2d 267 (N.C.Ct.App.1988); 
Mullen v. Alarmguard of Delmarva, Inc., No. CIV. A. 90C-11-40-1-CV, 1993 WL 258696 
(Del.Super.Ct., Jun.16, 1993). 
A much closer question is whether a successor corporation's actual or 
constructive knowledge that the predecessor's products are defective and likely to 
cause injury in the future is sufficient to render the transaction sufficiently 
tainted so as to come within the umbrella of this exception. There is little 
authority on the issue. In Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 569 n. 2 (Md.1991) 
, the court noted that either knowledge of pending claims or knowledge of product 
defects might be sufficient to expose a successor liability since either would put 
in question the bona fides of the transaction. 
Comment f. Consolidation or merger. For a discussion of what constitutes a "de 
facto merger," see Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, § 7124.20; American Law of 
Products Liability § 7:10; Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability § 7.04[5]; 
Comment, Successor Liability: The Debate Over the Continuity of Enterprise 
Exception in Ohio Is Really No Debate at All, 21 Ohio N.L. Rev. 297, 313 
nn.136-137 (1994) (describing de facto merger and "mere continuation" doctrines). 
When the successor purchases the assets of the predecessor for cash, a de facto 
merger will not be found to have occurred. See, e.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 
F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir.1977) (applying Indiana law); Jordan v. Hawker Dayton 
Corp., 62 F.3d 29 (1st Cir.1995) (applying Maine law); Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 
438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn.1989); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515, 
518 (S.D.1986); Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439-40 (7th Cir.1977) 
(applying Wisconsin law). Only courts applying the "continuity of enterprise" 
exception will impose liability when the successor corporation purchased the 
assets of the predecessor for cash and there is evidence of continuity of the 
original business. See Reporters' Note to Comment c. 
Comment g. Continuation of the predecessor. For a discussion of the "mere 
continuation" exception, see Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 7124.10; American 
Law of Products Liability § 7:14; Frumer and Friedman § 7.04 [4] . Also see Winch 
v. Yates Am. Mach. Co., Inc., 613 N.Y.S.2d 980 (N.Y.App.Div.1994); Swayze v. A.O. 
Smith Corp., 694 F.Supp. 619 (E.D.Ark.1988); Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 
578 n. 3 (10th Cir.1989) (applying Colorado law); Johnston v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 
830 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Colo.Ct.App.1992); Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 567 
(Md.1991); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir.1981) (applying 
Missouri law); Chemical Design, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488 
(Mo.Ct.App.1993); U.S. v. Atlas Minerals & Chem., Inc., 824 F.Supp. 46 
(E.D.Pa.1993); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515, 518 
(S.D.1986). 
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In analyzing continuation questions, some courts require purchase of stock or 
other benchmarks in order to establish the requisite continuity. See, e.g., 
Gehin-Scott v. Newson, Inc., 848 F.Supp. 585 (E.D.Pa.1994); Pancratz v. Monsanto 
Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1996) ("[t]he exception has no application without 
proof of continuity of management and ownership between the predecessor and 
successor corporations"); Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 §.E.2d 605 (Va.1992) (also 
requiring a common identity of officers, directors, and stockholders). Other 
courts deny a merger if no transfer of assets has taken place, as in Carreiro v. 
Rhodes Gill & Co., 68 F.3d 1443 (1st Cir.1995). Contra, Jordan v. Hawker Dayton 
Corp., 62 F.3d 29 (1st Cir.1995) (applying Maine law) (holding that purchase of 
assets is not sufficient to warrant a finding of a de facto merger); Lemelle v. 
Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268 (5th Cir.1994) (applying Louisiana law). But 
several other states have imposed liability based on a continuation of the 
predecessor's business even when there was no stock transfer or common identity of 
corporate directors. See, e.g., Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons, Co., 369 So.2d 
781, 785 (Ala.1979); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich.1976); 
MacCleery v. T.S.S. Retail Corp., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 1(1409 (D. N.H. 1994). See 
generally Sweatland v. Park Corp., 587 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y.App.Div.1992). 
Research References 
1. Digest System Key Numbers 
Products Liability €=> 23.1, 25. 
2. A.L.R. Annotations 
Liability of successor corporation for punitive damages for injury caused by 
predecessor's product. 55 ALR4th 166. 
Successor products liability: form of business organization of successor or 
predecessor as affecting successor liability. 32 ALR4th 196. 
Products liability: liability of successor corporation for injury or damage caused 
by product issued by predecessor. 66 ALR3d 824. 
Comment Note.--Validity and construction of state statute making successor 
corporation liable for taxes of predecessor. 65 ALR3d 1181. 
Similarity of ownership or control as basis for charging corporation acquiring 
assets of another with liability for former owner's debts. 49 ALR3d 881. 
Case Citations 
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Case Citations July 1984 through June 2003: 
Note: On p. 219 of the Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability, Reporters' 
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Note to § 12, comment d, should read as follows: For general authority that 
agreements to assume liability will be enforced in favor of plaintiffs with 
products liability claims, see cases cited in the Reporters' Note to comment b. 
M.D.Ga.1999. Com. (b) cit. in disc. A corporation that purchased assets of a 
limited partnership brought a CERCLA action against the limited partnership for 
contribution of funds for cleanup costs. This court denied defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, holding, inter alia, that the bill of sale failed to transfer 
environmental liability from the seller to the buyer. The court rejected 
defendant's assertion that the court should infer an agreement by plaintiff to 
assume the liabilities of the seller by virtue of plaintiff's status as a 
successor corporation. Even if plaintiff was a mere continuation of seller, that 
only meant that plaintiff assumed the partnership's environmental liabilities with 
respect to third parties. There was no case-law precedent that a successor 
corporation was liable to its predecessor based solely on the relationship between 
the two parties. Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. Cleveland, 72 F.Supp.2d 1373, 1381. 
S.D.Ga.2003. Com. (h) quot. but dist. After worker was killed in explosion of 
pressure vessel, representatives of his estate brought state-court action against 
corporate successors to manufacturer of pressure vessel; defendants removed action 
to federal court. Granting plaintiffs' motion to remand, district court held that 
removal was barred by unanimity rule. The court commented that successor liability 
might have no application where, following corporate reorganization, there was no 
devolution of assets and liabilities to successor corporations, and predecessor 
corporation continued to exist. Bussey v. Modern Welding Co., 245 F.Supp.2d 1269, 
1275-1276. 
D.Mass. 1997. Quot. in disc, com. (b) cit. in disc. (Proposed Final Draft, 
1997). Potentially responsible parties (PRPs) who entered a consent decree with 
the EPA regarding the cleanup of a dump site brought a contribution action under 
CERCLA against nonsettling PRPs. This court, among other dispositions, determined 
that to the extent that CERCLA provided that a successor corporation who owns a 
facility where hazardous waste was deposited will be liable even though the 
successor did not actually dispose of the waste, the statute expressed a choice 
for somewhat greater successor liability than was either the choice manifested in 
precedents or the choice supported by the Restatement. The court noted that the 
need for substantive law rules to protect against transactions and events that had 
"judgment-proofing consequences" in waste-disposal cases had been recognized in 
the area of products liability. Acushnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc., 972 F.Supp. 41, 66, 
affirmed 191 F.3d 69 (1st Cir.1999). 
S.D.N.Y.2002. Com. (b) cit. in disc, and cit. in ftn., Rptr's Notes to corns, 
(b) and (c) cit. in ftn. Creditor sought to recover debt from corporation that 
purchased assets of debtor-corporation. Adopting magistrate's report and 
recommendation, this court granted purchaser's motions for summary judgment and 
dismissal, holding, inter alia, that creditor's complaint failed to establish 
successor liability under theory of "de facto merger," since creditor failed to 
plead continuity of ownership. Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 207 F.Supp.2d 
86, 106, 112, affirmed 352 F.3d 41 (2d Cir.2003). 
Alaska, 2000. Cit. generally in disc, com. (b) and Rptr's Note cit. in ftn. 
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After a child was injured when a defective rifle discharged during target 
shooting, child's father sued the rifle manufacturer and its distributor. 
Distributor filed a third-party action for indemnification from manufacturer's 
successor. The trial court held that successor corporation could be held liable. 
This court reversed and remanded, holding, inter alia, that the court would adopt 
the "continuity of enterprise" exception to the general rule of nonliability for 
corporate successors. To permit successor to avoid liability would give it an 
unwarranted windfall; the court's new rule would give manufacturing corporations 
additional incentives to market nondefective products, in order to maximize the 
corporations' market value in event of sale. Savage Arms, Inc. v. Western Auto 
Supply, 18 P.3d 49, 56-58. 
Ariz.App.2003. Cit. and quot. in sup.; cit. in ftn.; subsecs. (b) and (d) quot. 
in sup.; Rptr's Note, com. (b) , quot. in disc; Rptr's Note, com. (c) , cit. in 
disc. Worker who was injured when a pane of glass he was installing shattered 
brought a products-liability action against successor of glass-pane manufacturer. 
Affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendant, this court 
held that Arizona products-liability law did not apply to successor corporations 
not involved in placing the product into the stream of commerce. The court 
deferred to the legislature the question whether successor corporations should 
take on the risk-spreading role of the original manufacturer. Winsor v. Glasswerks 
PHX, L.L.C., 204 Ariz. 303, 63 P.3d 1040, 1045, 1048, 1050. 
Ga.App.1997. Cit. in disc. (Proposed Final Draft, 1997). A motorist who was 
injured in a collision with a rig consisting of a tractor and two trailers, one of 
which had come unhitched, sued the driver of the rig and the driver's employer. 
Defendants then filed a third-party complaint against the corporation that had 
purchased the assets of the manufacturer of the rig's hitch pin that allegedly 
failed. Reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the corporation, 
this court held, inter alia, that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether the corporation had assumed the liabilities of the manufacturer so as to 
render the corporation strictly liable in tort to the motorist for a defect in the 
hitch pin. Corbin v. Farmex, Inc., 227 Ga.App. 620, 490 S.E.2d 395, 397, reversed 
269 Ga. 548, 501 S.E.2d 802 (1998), opinion vacated 506 S.E.2d 406 (Ga.App.1998) . 
Ky.2002. Cit. in disc. Mother whose son lost part of his leg while trying to 
unclog a silo unloader brought a products-liability action against manufacturer of 
silo unloaders under a theory of successor-in-interest liability. The trial court 
entered summary judgment for defendant, and the court of appeals affirmed. 
Affirming, this court held, inter alia, that defendant was not liable on a 
successor-liability theory because defendant did not expressly or impliedly agree 
to assume the liabilities of the selling corporation whose assets it purchased, 
the transaction was not a consolidation or merger, defendant was not a 
continuation of the selling corporation, and the transaction was not entered into 
fraudulently. Pearson ex rel. Trent v. National Feeding Systems, Inc., 90 S.W.3d 
46, 51. 
N.J.1998. Com. (b) cit. in disc, and quot. in diss, op., Rptr's Note quot. in 
diss. op. After a convenience-store worker who cut his hand on the unguarded blade 
of a meat-slicing machine brought a products-liability action against the 
machine's manufacturer, which did not answer, and a distributor, the distributor 
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filed a third-party complaint for indemnification against the alleged 
successor-in-interest of the manufacturer. The trial court granted successor's 
motion for summary judgment dismissing distributor's third-party claim, and the 
appellate division reversed. Affirming as modified, this court held, inter alia, 
that distributors and retailers could seek indemnification, pursuant to the 
"product-line exception," from corporations that purchased all or substantially 
all of the original manufacturer's assets and undertook essentially the same 
manufacturing operation. The dissent argued that the product-line exception was 
intended to provide an otherwise remediless injured plaintiff with a source of 
compensation and should not be extended to benefit corporate defendants. Mettinger 
v. Globe Slicing Mach., 153 N.J. 371, 381, 394, 709 A.2d 779, 783, 790. 
N.J. 1999. Cit. in disc, cit. in diss, op., corns, (a) and (b) cit. in disc. 
Injured forklift operator brought products-liability action against manufacturer 
of forklift and manufacturer's successor-in-interest. The trial court dismissed 
successor on the ground that it had acquired manufacturer's assets in a bankruptcy 
sale that was free and clear of any interests in the purchased property. The 
intermediate appellate court reversed. Affirming, this court held, in part, that 
the "product-line" exception to the general rule of successor nonliability applied 
here, where successor continued to manufacture the line of products it acquired 
from its predecessor. Dissent believed that plaintiff could and should have filed 
a claim against the intermediate purchaser in that entity's bankruptcy proceeding; 
therefore, successor liability was not justified. Lefever v. K.P. Hovnanian 
Enterprises, Inc., 160 N.J. 307, 734 A.2d 290, 294, 295, 300, 301. 
N. J.Super .1997. Com. (a) and Rptr's Notes cit. and quot. in disc, com. (c) 
quot. in disc (Proposed Final Draft, 1997). A worker who was injured while 
operating an allegedly defective flexofolder gluer machine manufactured by a 
now-bankrupt company brought suit against, among others, the licensee of the right 
to manufacture and market the machine. The trial court denied defendant's motion 
for summary judgment. Remanding for further proceedings on the issue of 
defendant's successor liability, this court held, inter alia, that genuine issues 
of material fact, precluding summary judgment, existed as to whether defendant in 
fact continued the manufacturer's product line and whether it in fact held itself 
out to the industry as doing so. The court noted that, for successor liability 
under New Jersey law, there must be a continued manufacture of the product line 
wherein the purchaser utilized the predecessor's name and good will. Saez v. S & S 
Corrugated Paper, 302 N.J.Super. 545, 555-557, 695 A.2d 740, 746. 
N.Y.Sup.Ct.App.Div.1999. Com. (b) and Rptr's Note cit. in disc. City sued 
successors of a manufacturer of asbestos-containing plaster, seeking to recover 
the costs of abating the asbestos-containing materials from their buildings. Trial 
court granted defendants summary judgment. This court affirmed, holding that the 
successors did not succeed to the manufacturer's liabilities. The court declined 
to adopt the "product line" theory of successor's liability, noting that that 
approach implicated complex economic considerations better left to be addressed by 
the legislature. City of New York v. Charles Pfizer & Company, Inc., 260 A.D.2d 
174, 688 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25. 
N.Y.Sup.Ct.App.Div.1999. Cit. in disc After a 50-year-old man died while 
undergoing exploratory surgery as a result of internal bleeding due to an 
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angiosarcoma mass on his liver, his widow sued corporate defendants for products 
liability, seeking to hold defendants liable as successors in interest to the 
manufacturer of a radioactive contrast dye administered to the decedent as a 
10-year-old child. Trial court granted summary judgment to all but one of the 
corporate defendants. This court reversed in part, holding, inter alia, that the 
trial court erred in applying the product-line exception to hold the one defendant 
liable, because this defendant only owned the dye-related assets for six months 
and thus did not have the opportunity or ability to estimate the risk of claims 
and to pass the cost of meeting those risks along to the public. In addition, this 
successor defendant did not reap the benefits of the predecessor's good will by 
continuing to sell the dye. Rothstein v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 259 A.D.2d 
54, 696 N.Y.S.2d 528, 531. 
Pa.Super.2000. Cit. and quot. in ftn. Employee who was injured when she was 
thrown from her employer's modified van brought, in part, a 
strict-products-liability claim against former corporate owners of the van, which 
had been transferred, along with other corporate assets, to plaintiff's employer 
as the result of a stock sale. Affirming the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment for defendants, this court held, inter alia, that defendants, who were 
not in the business of selling vans, were not "sellers" within the meaning of 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, and thus were not strictly liable for the 
alleged defects in the van. Gavula v. ARA Services, Inc., 756 A.2d 17, 21. 
Tex.2000. Cit. in disc. After two Marines were killed in a Navy helicopter 
crash due to the failure of a bearing, victims' survivors brought a wrongful-death 
suit against several corporations, including bearing manufacturer's successor, 
alleging products liability and negligence. Trial court entered judgment on jury 
verdict for plaintiffs. Appellate court affirmed in part. This court reversed in 
part and remanded, holding, inter alia, that trial court erroneously instructed 
jury on successor manufacturer's liability, because jury charge omitted elements 
necessary to impose liability under plaintiffs' negligent-undertaking claim. 
Although plaintiffs cited Restatement Third of Torts: Products Liability §§ 10-13, 
the court did not decide whether those sections were consistent with Texas law. 
Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 836. 
Tex. App. 2000. Quot. in disc, com. (a) quot. in part in ftn., subsecs. (3) and 
(4) cit. generally in ftn. Class of foundry workers sued manufacturers and 
suppliers of silica products and safety equipment to recover damages for personal 
injuries allegedly resulting from their exposure to silica compounds. One 
defendant, as successor-in-interest to corporation that bought one supplier's 
assets, answered with a verified denial that challenged its capacity to be sued. 
Reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs and 
remanding, this court held, inter alia, that under Delaware law, the corporation 
that bought the assets did not expressly or impliedly assume liability for the 
seller's contingent torts, and thus defendant had no successor liability. Lockheed 
Martin Corp. v. Gordon, 16 S.W.3d 127, 134, 135. 
Tex.App.2001. Quot. generally in ftn., cit. generally in cases cit. in disc. 
Author sued publisher, its owner, and her son for breach of contract, fraud, and 
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The trial 
court sustained jurisdiction over defendants, denying their special appearances. 
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Reversing in part and remanding, this court held that publisher was not subject to 
personal jurisdiction as successor-in-interest to debtor company that had 
misrepresented to plaintiff its ability to publish his book, where publisher had 
purchased only assets of debtor in debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. The court said 
that publisher had not expressly assumed seller's liabilities, and no other 
statute applied to provide an exception to the rule of successor nonliability for 
purchasers of assets. Shapolsky v. Brewton, 56 S.W.3d 120, 139. 
Case Citations July 2004 through June 2005: 
D.Ariz.2003. Cit. in case cit. in ftn. After dogs became ill when they ate pet 
food, pet-food manufacturer sued company that sold it vomitoxin-infected wheat, 
alleging strict products liability. This court granted defendant summary judgment, 
holding that wheat containing vomitoxin was not unreasonably dangerous under the 
consumer-expectation test, since a reasonable jury could not objectively find that 
wheat containing vomitoxin in excess of 5 ppm or in excess of maximum level that 
FDA said was safe for certain animals (10 ppm) was dangerous to extent beyond that 
which would be contemplated by ordinary pet-food manufacturer contracting for feed 
wheat in 1995. The court did not determine whether the wheat containing vomitoxin 
that defendant provided to plaintiff was defective as a matter of law. Southwest 
Pet Products, Inc. v. Koch Industries, 273 F.Supp.2d 1041, 1052. 
N.H.2003. Rptr's Note cit. in case cit. in disc. Holders of a promissory note 
sued corporate maker's successor to recover the balance due. Affirming the trial 
court's entry of judgment for defendant, this court rejected the more expansive 
"substantial continuity" version of the "mere continuation" exception to the 
prohibition against successor liability, and held, inter alia, that the fact that 
three separate entities, i.e., selling corporation, new corporation that continued 
selling corporation's commercial real estate operations, and defendant, existed 
after defendant's purchase of original maker's residential real estate assets 
precluded successor liability from being imposed on defendant under the 
mere-continuation exception. Bielagus v. EMRE of New Hampshire Corp., 149 N.H. 
635, 826 A.2d 559, 569. 
Tex.App.2004. Cit. in ftn. Commissioned-sales agent for magnetometers 
manufacturer sought to recover commissions under sales agreements, after assets of 
manufacturer were purchased by successor entity, by claiming, among other things, 
that successor entity tortiously interfered with the agreements. Trial court, 
inter alia, directed verdict for successor entity on this claim. Affirming in 
part, this court held, inter alia, that by enacting article 5.10(B)(2) of the 
Business Corporation Act, the legislature rejected three exceptions to the 
majority rule of successor nonliability, including the "mere continuation" theory 
claimed here; therefore, as matter of law, successor entity showed that its 
acquisition of manufacturer's assets was justified, and that it was not liable for 
payment on the agreements. C M . Asfahl Agency v. Tensor, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 768, 792. 
(1998) 
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Restatement of the Law -- Torts 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 
Current through April 2006 
Copyright ® 1998-2006 by the American Law Institute 
Chapter 3. Liability Of Successors And Apparent Manufacturers 
§ 13. Liability Of Successor For Harm Caused By Successor's Own Post-Sale Failure 
To Warn 
Link to Case Citations 
(a) A successor corporation or other business entity that acquires assets of a 
predecessor corporation or other business entity, whether or not liable under the 
rule stated in § 12, is subject to liability for harm to persons or property 
caused by the successor's failure to warn of a risk created by a product sold or 
distributed by the predecessor if: 
(1) the successor undertakes or agrees to provide services for maintenance 
or repair of the product or enters into a similar relationship with purchasers 
of the predecessor's products giving rise to actual or potential economic 
advantage to the successor, and 
(2) a reasonable person in the position of the successor would provide a 
warning. 
(b) A reasonable person in the position of the successor would provide a 
warning if: 
(1) the successor knows or reasonably should know that the product poses a 
substantial risk of harm to persons or property; and 
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can be identified and can 
reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm; and 
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and acted on by those to 
whom a warning might be provided; and 
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden of 
providing a warning. 
Comment: 
a. Rationale. Corporations that acquire assets from other corporations are 
liable for harm caused by defective products sold by predecessors only in limited 
2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
REST 3d TORTS-PL § 13 Page 2 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 13 (1998) 
circumstances. See § 12. This Section subjects a successor to liability for its 
own failure to warn after acquiring the predecessor's assets when certain 
conditions are satisfied and when a reasonable person in the successor's position 
would provide a warning. Liability under this Section is similar to liability 
under § 10, in which a seller is liable for harm caused by breach of a post-sale 
duty to warn even if the product was not defective at the time of original sale. 
Unlike product sellers in § 10, the successor governed by this Section did not 
manufacture or sell the defective product. However, by virtue of succeeding to the 
predecessor's interests, the successor is often in a good position to learn of 
problems arising from use of the predecessor's product and to prevent harm to 
persons or property. When the relationship between the successor and pre-transfer 
purchasers of the predecessor's products gives rise to actual or potential 
economic benefit to the successor, it is both fair and efficient to require the 
successor to act reasonably to prevent such harm. 
jb. Relationship between the successor and the predecessor's customers. Absent 
some additional circumstance besides having become a successor, the successor 
remains a pure volunteer upon whom the law usually imposes no duty to act or to 
warn. Many courts have recognized four elements as being significant in 
determining the existence of a duty to warn: (1) succession to a predecessor's 
service contracts; (2) coverage of the defective product under a service contract 
made directly with the successor; (3) actual service of the defective product by 
the successor; and (4) the successor's knowledge of the existence of defects and 
the identities of the predecessor's customers who own the defective product. 
However, these factors are not exhaustive and the inquiry should be whether the 
successor's relationships with the predecessor's customers give rise to actual or 
potential economic advantage. 
In most instances, in the absence of service contracts governing the 
predecessor's products or actual service of the defective product by the 
successor, it will be difficult to establish that the successor's relationships 
with the predecessor's customers give rise to actual or potential economic benefit 
to the successor. Furthermore, in the absence of service contracts, it may be 
difficult to establish under Subsection (b)(1) through (4) that a reasonable 
person in the position of the successor would provide a warning. Thus, when the 
successor has established no systematic relationships with the predecessor's 
customers through service contracts, usually the successor has no practical method 
of identifying those customers and communicating effectively with them. The 
successor who has no continuing contacts with a predecessor's customers may also 
be unable to discover risks that should be addressed through warnings. Similarly, 
when a successor has discontinued both the sale of a predecessor's product line 
and the provision of services to the predecessor's customers, it may not be in a 
position reasonably to discover risks about the discontinued line or to determine 
the persons to whom a warning should be addressed. 
Notwithstanding the importance of service contracts in the application of this 
Section, a contract is not the only method of establishing a relationship with a 
predecessor's customers. For example, a successor may sell or offer to sell spare 
parts to the predecessor's customers for machinery sold by the predecessor when 
the successor knows or should know the machinery is defective. Such conduct should 
be considered by courts in deciding whether sufficient actual or potential 
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economic advantage has accrued to the successor to warrant the imposition of a 
duty to warn the predecessor's customers. 
c. Factors in determining whether a reasonable successor would provide a 
warning. Whether a reasonable person in the successor's position would provide a 
warning is governed by the same requirements that determine whether a reasonable 
seller should provide a post-sale warning under § 10. Subsection (b)(1) through 
(4) are identical to the requirements set forth in Subsection (b)(1) through (4) 
of § 10 and are explained in the Comments to § 10. 
Illustrations: 
1. ABC Corp., which manufactures and sells plastic molding machines, 
transfers all its assets to XYZ Corp. for cash and then dissolves. There is no 
continuity of shareholders, officers, or directors from ABC to XYZ. Thus, XYZ 
is not liable as a successor corporation for defective products previously sold 
by ABC under the rule stated in § 12. Marks Plastics Co. purchased five Model 
1010 molding machines from ABC one year before ABC's transfer of assets to XYZ. 
At that time Marks entered into a three-year service contract with ABC. After 
acquiring ABC's assets, XYZ continues to service ABC's customers and 
periodically sends its service people to the Marks plant. The ongoing service 
contracts between XYZ and Marks constitute relationships that give rise to 
actual economic advantage to XYZ. Two years after acquiring ABC's assets, XYZ 
begins to receive reports from the field that, after completing one cycle, the 
Model 1010 machine sometimes recycles unexpectedly. XYZ does not inform Marks 
about the problem. Subsequently, Marks's employee, E, is injured when the Model 
1010 recycles unexpectedly. XYZ owes a duty to E to act as a reasonable person 
in warning Marks about the dangers attendant to the use of Model 1010. Whether 
XYZ breached its duty is to be determined based on the factors set forth in 
Subsection (b)(1) through (4). 
2. Same facts as Illustration 1, except that XYZ does not succeed to any 
service contracts from ABC nor does it enter into any service contracts of its 
own with Marks Plastic Co. However, after XYZ becomes aware of the recycling 
problem with the Model 1010 machine it enters into negotiations with Marks to 
sell replacement parts for the Model 1010. Before the sale is completed, Mark's 
employee, E, is injured when the Model 1010 unexpectedly recycles. The offer to 
sell replacement parts for Model 1010 constitutes a relationship that gives 
rise to potential economic advantages to XYZ. XYZ owes a duty to act as a 
reasonable person in providing a warning. Whether XYZ breached its duty to E to 
warn Marks about the dangers attendant to the use of the Model 1010 is to be 
determined upon the basis of the factors set forth in Subsection (b)(1) through 
(4) . 
3. Same facts as Illustration 1, except that, upon purchasing the assets of 
ABC, XYZ discontinues the manufacture and sale of molding machines and 
thereafter manufactures only drill presses. XYZ also discontinues all service 
contracts with ABC's customers, including Marks, and is not otherwise in 
contact with them. XYZ is not subject to liability for failure to warn. There 
is no relationship between XYZ and Marks that would give rise to actual or 
potential benefit to XYZ. XYZ has no duty to warn Marks about the dangers 
attendant to the use of the Model 1010. 
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REPORTERS1 NOTE 
Comment a. Rationale. A significant body of case law supports the proposition 
that a successor corporation has an independent duty to warn when it has a 
substantial continuing relationship with the customer of the predecessor 
corporation. See, e.g., Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 866 (9th Cir.1980) 
(applying California law); Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 577 (10th 
Cir.1989) (applying Colorado law); Gonzalez v. Rock Wool Eng'g & Equip., 453 
N.E.2d 792 (111.App.Ct.1983); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 449 (7th 
Cir.1977) (applying Indiana law); Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290 
(Kan.Ct.App.1984); Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir.1996) 
(applying Kansas law); Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614, 621 
(Mich.Ct.App.1981); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 177 (5th Cir.1985) 
(applying Mississippi law); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th 
Cir.1981) (applying Missouri law); Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 356 A.2d 458 
(N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div.1976); Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195 
(N.Y.1983); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods. Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 125 
(N.D.1984); Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 337-38 (Ohio 
1987); Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F.Supp. 526 (E.D.Pa.1971); Tracey by Tracey v. 
Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 745 F.Supp. 1099 (E.D.Pa.1990) (applying New York 
law); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127-28 (Vt.1984); Polius v. 
Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 84 (3d Cir.1986) (applying Virgin Islands law); 
Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 441-42 (7th Cir.1977) (applying 
Wisconsin law). 
In a recent case, Sherlock v. Quality Control Equipment Co., 79 F.3d 731 (8th 
Cir.1996) (applying Missouri law), the court affirmed a jury verdict for the 
plaintiff against a successor corporation that sold replacement parts for a 
machine sold to the predecessor's customer and rejected the defendant's argument 
that it had no post-sale duty to warn the predecessor's customers of dangers it 
had learned about concerning the machinery after succeeding to the interests of 
the predecessor. The court said: 
In determining the existence of a relationship sufficient to justify 
foisting a duty to warn of known dangers on the successor corporation, the 
courts have often cited four factors as being significant. See, e.g., Tucker, 
645 F.2d at 626. These elements include: "(1) succession to a predecessor's 
service contracts; (2) coverage of the particular machine under the contract; 
(3) service of that machine by the purchaser-corporation; and (4) the 
purchaser-corporation's knowledge of defects and of the location or owner of 
that machine." Id. While these factors are indisputably important, and in many-
cases dispositive, we remain mindful that they are merely useful tools which 
provide evidence in resolving the ultimate inquiry: whether there is an 
adequate nexus between the successor and the predecessor's customers. See 
Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 125 (N.D.1984) ( 
"This listing [of factors] cannot be said to be exhaustive."). As explained in 
one of the foremost authorities on corporate law: 
The critical element required for the imposition of the duty is a continuing 
relationship between the successor and the predecessor's customers for the 
benefit of the successor. Hence, rather than relying only on the four specific 
factors above, which are not exhaustive in establishing a nexus between the 
successor and its predecessor's customers sufficient to justly impose an 
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independent duty to warn upon notice of dangers or potential dangers, the 
courts also employ a risk/benefit analysis. Thus, the focus in deciding whether 
the relationship between the successor corporation and the preexisting customer 
is sufficient to create a duty to warn has been upon the actual or potential 
economic advantage to the successor corporation. 
15 William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations § 7123.08 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990). 
Id. at 734 (emphasis added). 
The court reviewed the evidence and found that a sufficient nexus was made out 
to support an independent post-sale duty to warn: 
Relying on testimony from Quality's own officers and employees, the jury 
could reasonably have inferred that in 1983 Quality was probably the sole 
remaining manufacturer in the world of chitterling cleaning machines. 
Further, it appeared that Quality was by far the most easily accessible, if 
not the only, supplier of replacement parts for the Strickler chitterling 
cleaning machine. Indeed, this state of affairs contributed to Quality's 
decision to purchase the rights to assemble the machine, as Quality's 
president testified that an "attractive" feature of the transaction was the 
fact that Strickler was going out of business and Quality would thus be able 
to "step into [Strickler's] shoes" vis a vis the predecessor corporation's 
customers. Consequently, one could justifiably conclude that Quality 
perceived it to be economically advantageous to foster relationships with 
Strickler's customers; for, through these associations, Quality would have 
the opportunity not only to peddle replacement parts, but to one day 
possibly benefit from the sale of new machines to a clientele with 
apparently no other viable source for a needed product. To be sure, Quality 
did benefit in the instant case, having sold replacement parts to Monfort on 
twenty-four separate occasions. 
79 F.3d at 735. 
For a comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of this subject, see Victoria A. 
Kommer, The Successor Corporation's Continuing Duty to Warn, 23 Prod. Safety & 
Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, p. 990 et seq. (1995). The author notes that the cases 
speak of a "special relationship" necessary to trigger a duty to warn but fail to 
give content to that term. 
As the Comment indicates, many courts place heavy emphasis on whether the 
successor had ongoing service contracts with the customer of the predecessor 
corporation. See, e.g., Florom v. Elliott Mfg. Co., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir.1989) 
(applying Colorado law); Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290 
(Kan.App.1984); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.1985) 
(applying Mississippi law); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir.1981) 
(applying Missouri law); Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(applying Virgin Islands law). But see Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 
N.E.2d 195 (N.Y.1983). This Section does not make the existence of a service 
contract a sine qua non for the imposition of a duty to warn on a successor 
corporation. Other similar relationships with purchasers of the predecessor's 
products giving rise to actual or potential economic advantage to the successor 
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may suffice to create a duty to act reasonably and provide warnings. 
Comment c. Factors in determining whether a reasonable successor would provide 
a warning- Although some courts list actual or constructive knowledge of defect as 
a "factor" to be considered in determining whether a successor corporation owes a 
duty to warn others require actual knowledge as a necessary condition for the 
imposition of liability on the successor corporation. See, e.g., Gee v. Tenneco, 
Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 865-66 (9th Cir.1980); Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 
507 N.E.2d 331, 337-38 (Ohio 1987); Downtowner v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 
N.W.2d 118, 125 (N.D.1984); Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 84 (3d 
Cir.1986) (applying Virgin Islands law). 
This Section does not require actual knowledge of the risk as a condition for 
imposing liability. This is true both with regard to a seller's post-sale duty to 
warn and to a successor's independent duty to warn. As a practical matter it may 
be very difficult to establish that a seller or a successor could reasonably be 
saddled with the duty to investigate product performance. But the law should not 
establish an absolute barrier to recovery if constructive knowledge can be 
established. Otherwise one would encourage sellers or successors to close their 
eyes so that they not be tinged with "actual knowledge" that would impose duty 
upon them. As noted, drug manufacturers quite routinely have a duty to keep up 
with scientific research and to investigate when information of risk is brought to 
their attention. Other products may involve very significant risk and may require 
similar investigation. Thus, the duty to go out and "discover" risk may most often 
impose too onerous a burden. However, when the facts justify investigation and it 
can be practically accomplished, this Section sets up no artificial barrier 
against recovery. 
Research References 
1. Digest System Key Numbers 
Products Liability €=> 14, 23.1, 25. 
2. A.L.R. Annotations 
Products liability: liability of manufacturer or seller as affected by failure of 
subsequent party in distribution chain to remedy or warn against defect of 
which he knew. 45 ALR4th 777. 
Strict products liability: liability for failure to warn as dependent on 
defendant's knowledge of danger. 33 ALR4th 368. 
Products liability: liability of successor corporation for injury or damage caused 
by product issued by predecessor. 66 ALR3d 824. 
Failure to warn as basis of liability under doctrine of strict liability in tort. 
53 ALR3d 23 9. 
Liability of corporation for torts of subsidiary. 7 ALR3d 1343. 
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Manufacturer's or seller's duty to give warning regarding product as affecting his 
liability for product-caused injury. 76 ALR2d 9. 
Case Citations 
Case Citations July 1984 through June 2003 
Case Citations July 2004 through June 2005 
Case Citations July 1984 through June 2003: 
Cal.App.2000. Cit. in disc, subsec. (b) cit. and quot. in disc. After a plane 
crash allegedly caused by a malfunction in the plane engine's carburetor, the 
pilot and the passenger sued an aircraft-parts manufacturer that did not 
manufacture or sell this particular model of carburetor but acquired the product 
line from a predecessor that had acquired it from the original manufacturer. The 
carburetor was manufactured and sold in 1968, over 25 years prior to the accident. 
Trial court granted defendant summary judgment, holding that the General Aviation 
Revitalization Act barred plaintiffs' claims against defendant in its capacity as 
successor to the original manufacturer. This court affirmed, holding, inter alia, 
that plaintiffs failed to establish a negligence cause of action based on a theory 
of independent duty to warn. The court stated that imposing a separate and 
independent duty based on general principles of tort law would not only be 
superfluous in light of the federal statutory scheme regulating and overseeing the 
duties of manufacturers in the general aviation industry, but would also directly 
conflict with that statutory scheme. Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 78 
Cal.App.4th 681, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 124, 134, 136. 
Ga.App.1997. Cit. in disc. (Proposed Final Draft, 1997). (Erron. cit. as 
Restatement of the Law, Torts.) A motorist who was injured in a collision with a 
rig consisting of a tractor and two trailers, one of which had come unhitched, 
sued the driver of the rig and the driver's employer. Defendants then filed a 
third-party complaint against the corporation that had purchased the assets of the 
manufacturer of the rig's hitch pin that allegedly failed. The trial court granted 
summary judgment for the corporation. Reversing on other grounds, this court held, 
inter alia, that the corporation could not be held liable on a negligence theory, 
since there was no evidence that the danger was reasonably foreseeable. Corbin v. 
Farmex, Inc., 227 Ga.App. 620, 490 S.E.2d 395, 399, reversed 269 Ga. 548, 501 
S.E.2d 802 (1998), opinion vacated 506 S.E.2d 406 (Ga.App.1998). 
Ga.App.2000. Cit. in case cit. in disc, cit. in case cit. but dist., cit. in 
disc, subsecs. (b)(1) and (b)(2) cit. in ftn. Tea company's mechanic who injured 
his hand while performing maintenance on a tea-bagging machine brought a 
products-liability action against successors to the corporation that sold and was 
responsible for servicing the machine, asserting a claim for negligent failure to 
warn of a defect that became known to defendants after the machine was sold. 
Affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendants, this court 
held, inter alia, that, under Georgia law, there was no postsale duty to warn on 
the part of either a product seller or its successor. Moreover, under Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 13, since plaintiff was aware of the risk 
that resulted in his injuries, any breach of a duty to warn him could not have 
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been the proximate cause of the injuries. DeLoach v. Rovema Corp., 241 Ga.App. 
802, 527 S.E.2d 882, 883. 
Ga.App.2001. Subsecs. (b)(1) and (b)(2) cit. in ftn. in sup. Worker who 
sustained serious cuts to her hand when machine she was using malfunctioned 
brought products-liability action against machine's manufacturer/seller. Trial 
court granted defendant summary judgment. Reversing, this court held, inter alia, 
that risk of injury to third person was foreseeable to defendant where defendant 
knew that plaintiff's employer continued to use defective machine after it was 
recalled. Smith v. Ontario Sewing Machine Co., Ltd., 249 Ga.App. 364, 369, 548 
S.E.2d 89, 95, judgment vacated 259 Ga.App. 30, 576 S.E.2d 38 (2002). 
Tex.2000. Cit. in disc. After two Marines were killed in a Navy helicopter 
crash due to the failure of a bearing, victims' survivors brought a wrongful-death 
suit against several corporations, including bearing manufacturer's successor, 
alleging products liability and negligence. Trial court entered judgment on jury 
verdict for plaintiffs. Appellate court affirmed in part. This court reversed in 
part and remanded, holding, inter alia, that trial court erroneously instructed 
jury on successor manufacturer's liability, because jury charge omitted elements 
necessary to impose liability under plaintiffs' negligent-undertaking claim. 
Although plaintiffs cited Restatement Third of Torts: Products Liability §§ 10-13, 
the court did not decide whether those sections were consistent with Texas law. 
Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 836. 
Case Citations July 2004 through June 2005: 
C.A.8, 2004. Com. (b) cit. in disc. Prison guard who suffered severe smoke 
inhalation during a training exercise when a black smoke grenade was activated 
brought a products-liability action against successor of company that manufactured 
the grenade, alleging failure to warn against indoor use. District court granted 
defendant summary judgment. This court reversed in part and remanded, holding, 
inter alia, that an issue of fact remained as to whether defendant could be liable 
for failure to place a warning on the grenade because a de facto merger occurred 
between defendant and the manufacturer. Even if plaintiff could prove that 
defendant benefited from the acquired company's customer lists, there was no 
suggestion that defendant was aware of the grenade's labeling defect. Gamradt v. 
Federal Laboratories, Inc., 380 F.3d 416, 421. 
(1998) 
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